India as a Poll Issue in Nepal
Posted by barunroy on April 25, 2008
By J. Sri Raman
India figures prominently as an issue in Nepal’s forthcoming elections. The Himalayan nation has always figured in India’s politics, too, and is likely to do so in a larger manner over the next few months.
The issue, which has showed varying degrees of visibility, has been particularly important for the far right. To the Bharatiya Janata Party and the parivar (the far right family), Nepal has not been a mere neighbor to the north. To them, it was the only “Hindu state,” so long as it was a mountain kingdom under an unpopular monarchy, and it remains the only other Hindu-majority nation.
Consequently, the BJP and the parivar have been strongly opposed to the anti-monarchy or democratic movement in Nepal and its constituents, particularly the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). In the current context, they are staunchly opposed to the major section of the movement that does not trust the deposed king enough even to retain him as a figurehead in a constitutional monarchy.
The Nepal policy of India’s far right is tied to its national politics aimed at making the BJP and the parivar the representative of the country’s religious majority. The policy has an international prop as well. In terms of the US-India “strategic partnership,” inaugurated by the BJP while in power during 1998-2004, Nepal is not only a “buffer state” between India and China, but a bulwark against the latter for South and South-East Asia.
The BJP and its band, in any case, cannot remain benign observers of the Nepal scene after the CPN(M) came out with its manifesto for the elections to a proposed Constituent Assembly (CA) to be held on April 10 (if the polls are not put off for a third time). The manifesto does make a major issue of India, especially the India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on July 31, 1950.
The manifesto says: “The non-reciprocal relations existing between Nepal and India since the days of British India must be re-evaluated in order to make the existing relations reciprocal. For this, mainly, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950, signed between India and Nepal must be annulled….”
What the Maoists and many other sections of Nepal’s political spectrum oppose more than anything else is the part of the treaty that makes India-Nepal relations sound like another strategic partnership. The objection, above all, is to two of the ten articles of the pact.
Under Article II of the treaty, the “two governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments.” Article V lays down: “The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.”
The pact was, in these respects, a reworking of the Treaty of 1923 between British India and Nepal. By that treaty, too, the two sides agreed to inform each other of any misunderstanding with the neighbouring states whose territories adjoined their common frontiers.
According to Article V of the treaty, the British government agreed that the Nepal government would be free to import arms, ammunition, machinery, war-like material, and stores as may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Nepal, and that the arrangement would continue so long as the British government was satisfied of the intentions of the Nepal government that there was no immediate danger to India from such importations.
India has always insisted on the treaty being read together with “letters exchanged” between New Delhi and Kathmandu in 1959 and 1965. These included Nepal in India’s security zone and precluded arms purchases without India’s approval.
At the height of the Maoists’ armed struggle, their supporters claimed that the treaty also contained some secret annexures, covering mutual assistance in case of an emergency such as their rebellion. Sections of Nepal’s media reported in February 2005 that General Pyar Jung Thapa, chief of the Royal Nepal Army, had hinted at King Gyanendra invoking the provisions of the treaty and seeking Indian military support against the Maoists.
The treaty came under considerable strain even during the period of monarchy, particularly on two occasions. The first instance followed the end of another unpopular monarchy in another Himalayan kingdom - Sikkim, adjoining Nepal on the east - in 1975, leading to what New Delhi described as its “integration” with India and what its critics denounced as an “annexation.” An anxious King Birendra Bir Bikram Dev Shah reacted by calling for international recognition of Nepal as a “zone of peace,” with India treating the idea backed by China and Pakistan as an attack on the treaty and the “special relationship” envisaged. The proposal was pursued, but with declining vigor and, finally, in vain.
The second time, matters threatened to take a more serious turn in 1988, when Nepal acquired some Chinese weaponry. New Delhi saw this as a flagrant violation of the treaty. The close economic relations between the two countries, governed by equally controversial treaties of transit and trade, however, gave New Delhi the clout to penalize Nepal through what even pro-India analysts have called a “blockade.” The pact did not face any substantial opposition from the palace in Kathmandu after that.
As for popular opinion on the issue, the Maoists can claim to articulate it to a significant extent when they declare that Nepal should cease to be branded a “buffer state” between India and China but should be regarded as a “dynamic link” between the two. The call to replace the present India-Nepal pact with a more “equal treaty” can also safely be presumed to enjoy majority support in the mountain state.
On the Indian side, there is talk - even in circles that regard as an encomium India’s description by the Maoists and others as an “expansionist power” - of bringing the treaty in better tune with the times. The treaty, however, provides for no revision, upgrading or updating. Article X of the document says, “The Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year’s notice” and no more.
This may well lead to a piquant situation in the aftermath of elections. Whichever party or group of parties comes to power in Kathmandu, a long round of tough negotiations - and worse - appears unavoidable.
A freelance journalist and a peace activist in India, J. Sri Raman is the author of “Flashpoint” (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to Truthout.
