Gorkhaland: An unrealistic proposition
Posted by barunroy on July 18, 2008
FROM MERINEWS
BY SUJIT ROY
ARTICLE SHARED BY KAMAL PRADHAN
THE FRUITLESS bipartite talks between the West Bengal chief minister and the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) have added a fresh lease of life to the Gorkhaland movement. Apart from this, a public announcement of the GJM leader Vimal Gurung to create Gorkhaland before 2010 and to go underground for six months before that has also breathed life into the movement. Sikkim’s Democratic Front leader and former state chief minister BB Gurung’s claim for the separate state of Gorkhaland is another contributor to the recent turn of events.
It may be noted that all these developments have shaped up in the same day. At the same time, these series of events have given birth to the question on the future of the hill queen, its added localities and its people.
The biggest question that romps on the current political situation is that whither goes Darjeeling? Will the state and the Centre ever allow the separation of West Bengal and creation of a new state? If so, at whose cost and for what reason? If not, what will be Gurung’s strategy? Will he follow the path of Ghising for a blood shedding movement? And even if Darjeeling gains its separate statehood, how will it run without having a strong economic backup?
It is anybody’s guess that the Centre will not bow down to the demands of the GJM, considering the demand on ethnic issues. Once the claim is approved, ethnic issues in other states too will gain momentum and that will be horrible to tackle. This will be a very costly proposition because the base of the movement lies in separatism – the most vulnerable danger before the central government. Another issue, which is more important, is the demographic situation of Darjeeling. Being a northern border area, Darjeeling has always posed threat of foreign aggression. Leave aside the immigration issues, largely related with illegal intrusion. This threat will mount manifold if Sikkim joins the movement because Sikkim is close to China. China has already claimed a part of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. The movers claim a bigger state with the inclusion of the Terai region. This is also a foolish proposition because this will give birth to serious political trouble and ethnic issues. Communal clashes are also not overruled. Is it believable that the Bengali population of the Terai region will accept the rule of the Gorkhas to remain as second class citizens?
So what will be Gurung’s stand in the expected scenario? He will go underground, as announced an definitely the announcement is not to hide from the movement but more evidently for initiating something more vigorous, even if it is not in the style of guerilla warfare. Is the state and the Centre ready to undertake the trouble of a greater master-plan to disturb the country’s communal and demographic fabric?
However, the most vulnerable point to be discussed in different forums is whether the Gurungs will be able to run, perhaps, the smaller state Gorkhaland without having enough revenues? And whether West Bengal will agree to abandon the revenue whatever may be the amount, being collected from the hill corner?
Administering a state without sufficient revenue generation is an imprudent offer because it is not like running a small family. The poorest family can only survive on begging. And in the case of Gorkhaland, the Gurungs will have to survive on central aids and subsidies. This is more troubling than freedom.
The hill queen Darjeeling, once a British colonial town, had been designed for a mere population of 10,000. But as per the 2001 census, the Darjeeling urban agglomeration with an area of 12.77 per square km has a population of 1,09,163. The municipal area only has a population of 1,07,530. The town has an additional average diurnal floating population of 20,500 – 30,000, mainly consisting of the tourists. The population density of the municipal area is 10,173 per square km. The sex ratio is 1,017 females per 1,000 males, which is higher than the national average. The town houses approximately 31 per cent of its population in the slums and shanty buildings — a consequence of heavy immigration. The major religion is Hinduism, followed by Buddhism. Christians and Muslims form minorities. The population’s ethnic composition is closely linked with that of Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim and Bengal. The majority of the populace is of ethnic Nepali background, having migrated to Darjeeling in search of jobs during the British rule. Indigenous ethnic groups include the Lepchas, Bhutias, Sherpas, Rais, Yamloos, Damais, Kamais, Newars and Limbus. Other communities that inhabit Darjeeling include the Bengalis, Marwaris, Anglo-Indians, Chinese, Biharis and Tibetans. The most commonly spoken language is Nepali (Gorkhali). However, Hindi, Bengali and English are also spoken.
Darjeeling has seen significant growth in its population during the last century, especially since the 1970s. Annual growth rates reached as high as 45 per cent in the 1990s, far above the national, state, and district averages. The subsequent population growth has created extensive infrastructural and environmental problems. The region is relatively new in geological terms and unstable in nature, suffering from a host of environmental problems. Environmental degradation, including denudation of the surrounding hills has adversely affected Darjeeling’s appeal as a tourist destination
With this background, the two most significant contributors to Darjeeling’s economy are tourism and the tea industry. Darjeeling tea is regarded as the best of the black teas and is widely popular, especially in Britain and the countries making up the former British empire. The tea industry has faced competition in recent years from tea produced in other parts of India as well as other countries like Nepal. Widespread concerns about labour disputes, worker lay-offs and closing of estates have affected investment and production. Several tea estates are being run on a workers’ cooperative model, while others are being planned for conversion into tourist resorts.
The district’s forests and other natural wealth have been adversely affected by an ever-growing population. The years since independence have seen substantial advances in the area’s education, communication and agriculture – the latter including the production of diverse cash crops like potato, cardamom, ginger, and oranges. Farming on terraced slopes is a major source of livelihood for the rural populace around the town and it supplies the town with fruits and vegetables.
Summer and spring seasons are most popular with tourists, keeping many of Darjeeling’s residents employed, directly and indirectly, with many residents owning and working in hotels and restaurants. Many people earn a living working
for tourism companies and as guides. Darjeeling is now one of the popular filming destination for Bollywood and Bengali cinema. Small contributions to the economy come from the sale of traditional arts and crafts of Sikkim and Tibet.
This is all, with enough thorn helmets on its head. It is difficult to say what economic plan does the GJM have in mind for the proposed Gorkhaland because they are yet to submit any document on its sustainability.
The questions, however, would take a separate turn if the whole of north Bengal joins the movement and poses a greater threat to the east and north-east region of the country.
G Chetrri said
Dear Sujit, who ever you are,
We do have Economic plan, How to make GL sustainable.
But why should we disclose it now. Do you think West Bengal is sustaining on it own, Without central aid you won’t get your fish.
Have you compared per capita income of the plains and hills.
You and your fellow Goverment does not understand the separation is not only for economics We in darjeeling hills is different than ‘you ‘ our culture to language to thinking pattern is different. please accept that and give us our state.
WB will be so much in debt if communists remain in power for next 10 years if we donot get separated we will also have to carry the load. so its better to be sparated before Bengal Economy crashes. If you want to pay less taxes come and join us for Separation from Bengal.
Midnight Oil said
My discussion with Barun reveals that Darjeeling Hills and Dooars Terai is one of the most gifted of the regions in the north east. It has tremendous potential in tourism, tea, agriculture including cash crops. It has rivers for large Hydel Power Projects. It has mineral resources yet to be exploited including coal, manganese, mica, gypsum etc. In tourism it can offer the entire kaleidoscope of Himalayan and Gangetic Geology, including trekking, mountain climbing, rafting, paragliding, river camping, wildlife sanctuaries etc.
Darjeeling can offer the most hyped spiritual tourism, village tourism, eco tourism, yoga tourism etc. The revenue that could be generated from these.
West Bengal (CPI-M) knows the potential of Darjeeling and thats the only reason why they do not want Darjeeling to be seperated. They know that Ramam Hydel Project is earning 5 lakh per hour.
bob said
the many reasons dear sujit has mentioned are but mere excuses. the one and only reason Bengal does not want to loose darjeeling is its huge economic potential and the revenues.so,no bengali who is opponent of gorkhaland should try to explain or teach us wat is right or wrong.coz every gorkha knows that gorkhaland is the ultimate solution for all the hill problems.regardless of who leads the movement.
Atit said
Darjeeling is famous for its tea, tourism comes the next. And you should know that the tea garden workers since tea were planted in the slopes of Darjeeling from the time of British Raj (India) were and now the Independant India are still the Gurkhas. To make this place famous as a tourist destination the secondarily Darjeeling is famous for nobody I declare nobody has contributed anything from hearts and minds apart from the Gurkhas. Bengali brothers and siters have you ever stayed in Darjeeling in the coldest winter in the past or now BIG NO if you never and don’t how could you talk about its security first of all do you actually know the real meaning of security but we the Gurkhas do who stay 365 days a year securing its borders because we love this land of ours and would not mind to die to get it by all means. Darjeeling was not built in a day our great great grandfathers, great grandfathers and grandfathersand fathers have carried rocks on their back to built Darjeeling as a result we were not afraid of that basu jyoti who have raped and murdered our people in our own land not thinking our contribution in making this great nation of Ours India Independant, prosperous, famous, or battacharya buddadev who still if opportunity comes will not hesitate to repeat what his big brother has done against the Gurkhas. But Gurkhas have learned great lessons from you Bengalies i.e how you manipulate, how you want to use the outdated British divide and rule policy against us. Sorry Bengali brothers and sisters like you we are also the citizens of our great nation INDIA and we know how to roll the ball when time comes so don’t ever imagine Gurkhas of Darjeeling, Dooars and rest of India will withdraw Khukri and will go to fight against the CRPF, WBP WE WILL NO AND NEVER BECAUSE WE KNEW THE CONSEQUENCE FROM THE PAST EXAMPLE WE HAVE LOST OUR GREAT LEADER NETAJI SUBASH CHANDRA BOSE WHOSE DEATH IS STILL A MYSTERY BASU JYOTI AND BHATTCHARYA BUDDHADEV NEVER EVER RAISE THE ISSUE ABOUT THE MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF NETAJI IN OUR COUNTRY OR TO THE WORLD BUT GURKHALAND WILL DO ITS HOMEWORK AND WILL SPENT TIME ON RESEARCH BECAUSE WE ARE NOT SELFISH, CORRUPT AND CROOK AND KNOW TO VALUE OUR GREAT LEADERS.
Bimal Gurung will not go underground he will stand and fight like Bapuji. He has the guts like Netaji Subashchandra Bose. He has the intelligence like Jawaharlal Nehru.
Jai Bharatbarsa
Jai Gorkhaland
Laird said
article on the history of Darjeeling published in The Statesman, Jul 18, 2008
( not the type of article that Burung Rai would post at his website ! )
Read On and clear your minds.
HILL HISTORY
The Darjeeling hill region was not a gift from Nepal. It was territory annexed by the House of Gorkha and won back by the British. Gorkha statehood activists are distorting history,
Darjeeling, a creation of the 19th century, was the result of the British Indian government’s active and direct involvement with Nepal. The East India Company’s acquaintance with Nepal goes as far back as 1767, however, when the three Newar kingdoms occupying the valley of Nepal appealed for British military assistance against the aggressive designs of Prithvi Narayan, the Gorkha ruler. Captain Kinloch was dispatched with a force but was compelled to retire due to the deadly climate of the Terai. The Gorkha chief overran Nepal and established his sway over the whole country, extending westward to the Kali river and eastward to Mechi.
The expansionist policy of Nepal under the Gorkhas continued, thereby bringing her into confrontation with Tibet, China, Sikkim and finally the East India Company. To cut a long story short, it is to be remembered that between 1804 and 1812, the relationship between Nepal and British India continued to deteriorate till war was declared in November 1814. After an arduous campaign the British took possession of the whole territory between the Kali and Sutlej rivers which had been annexed by Nepal. The Gorkha troops withdrew and the East India Company established direct control of the Himalayan districts of Kumaon and Garhwal. The remainder of the hill country was restored to the rajas (of whom Sikkim’s was one) and chiefs from whom Nepal had wrested these territories. All this was done by the Treaty of Segauli in 1816.
The East India Company’s relations with Sikkim may be traced to the Anglo-Nepalese war. The British had sought Sikkim’s support during the war due to its strategic position. It is essential to point out here that Darjeeling was originally a part of Sikkim. From the 1780s till the early 1800s, Sikkim was the victim of several inroads by the Gorkhas. At the end of the Anglo-Nepalese war the East India Company restored to Sikkim, by the Treaty of Titaliya in 1817, the territories that had been occupied by Nepal for quite sometime. It included the hill lands east of the Mechi and part of the terai between the Mechi and the Teesta. Henceforth the East India Company assumed a position of paramount importance in Sikkim; the company’s arbitration was to be sought in any dispute between Sikkim and her neighbouring states.
Ten years later, when a dispute arose again between Sikkim and Nepal, two Britishers, Liod George and JW Grant were sent by the East India Company to arbitrate in this dispute. Attracted by the captivating natural splendour of Darjeeling they requested the then Governor General, Lord Bentinck, to acquire it for a sanatorium. The British were quick to realise too the strategic importance of Darjeeling as a frontier station. Several advantages of the station came under consideration: its central position between Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal and British India; the nearest road to Lhasa from the British territory lay through Darjeeling by the Choomti valley; its military importance as the key of a pass into Nepal; its advantages as a sanatorium; and finally its proximity to Kolkata. On February 1835, by a deed of grant the Sikkim raja ceded Darjeeling to the company: “I the Sikkimese Raja, out of friendship for the said Governor General, hereby present Darjeeling to the East India Company, that is all the lands south of the Great Rangit river, east of the Balason, Kahail and little Rangit rivers and west of Rangno and Mahanadi rivers.”
Later in 1850, following an altercation between Sikkim and British India, all of Sikkim’s terai lands were seized by the British. This linked Darjeeling to the terai below ~ it ceased to be an enclave within Sikkimese territory. In the process Sikkim was cut off from all access to the plains. Finally after the Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1865, Kalimpong, along with the territories of western Dooars, was annexed and later in incorporated with Darjeeling in 1870.
When the British first acquired the hill territory in 1835 it was almost entirely under forests. The tract measuring 138 square miles contained a very scanty population consisting of the Lepchas of Sikkim who numbered roughly around a hundred. Once it came under the company, progress was quick particularly under the supervision of the first superintendent, Dr Campbell. The presence of Europeans in the hills with their many wants and demand for labour offered splendid job opportunities which the Nepalese were quick to grasp. With the introduction of tea and European capital investment in it, a big source of wealth was opened up ~ a new socio-economic pattern began emerging in the hills. To the timid, peace-loving Lepchas and Bhutias inhabiting particularly the tract of the Teesta were added the pushy, assertive Nepalese who flocked in hundreds from Nepal in search of employment. They were much in demand as labourers, in tea and cinchona gardens, for construction work on roads and for cultivation by clearing forests. These were the pull factors. There were also some push factors behind this heavy migration from Nepal ~ pressure on land leading to impoverishment of the peasantry, the system of conscription in the army, insufficient food supply and so on. Thus these men were pushed “from feudal Nepal to become the industrial proletariat of India”.
With these historical facts before us it would be erroneous to say that Nepal made a gift of the land east of the Mechi river, comprising the Darjeeling hills extending to the borders of Assam and on the west the land beyond the river Kali extending to the Garhwal region. These were not gifted by Nepal to the British, as a matter of fact, Nepal was forced to withdraw from these territories, which it had forcibly taken by way of aggression. The East India Company by taking a good share of its gain in the Anglo-Nepalese war returned the rest to their respective legal owners. It’s a pity that history is being distorted to suit narrow political ends and people, unaware of these details, are being misled.
To end, a word of caution. Statehood activists may be reminded that most statehood demands are more emotional than logical. With emotions running high, economic viability and ground realities are not properly investigated. Sound homework is needed.
(The writer is former Professor of History, North Bengal University)
aardee said
article on the history of Darjeeling published in The Statesman, Jul 18, 2008.
This has been posted by Barun on the blog…check the archives and if you as in Laird didn’t see it, then its your fault.
Also instead of writing all our comments to articles on the blog…do log on to the merinews.com site and give Mr Sujit Roy a fitting reply.
BTW I am happy various news media forums are raising and commenting on the Gorkhaland issue…lets use every article to highlight our cause and to tell the outside world our side of the story.
Bechara Sujit Roy…worried where he will get his cuppa chai – Darj & Assam both have Gorkhas involved in the tea buiness…
darjeeling said
Well Mr Sujit and Mr Pradhan……… you have put forward many practical aspects…. well done!!
Maakoora said
West Bengal Government on its wobbly pair of knees has started shiverring in its dhoti and is shamelessly using the ilks of Sujit Roys to extract our vision of Gorkhaland with sinister motive of hijacking the same and presumptuously offering run down versions of some of its ingredients in a platter “short of Gorkhaland”.
Their insincerity stinks, to say the least.
Their subtlety is loud and clear when they try to instigate us with screaming headlines like – “Gorkhaland: An unrealistic proposition” – as a bait, whereas the real hook is :
= “… It is difficult to say what economic plan does the GJM have in mind for the proposed Gorkhaland because they are yet to submit any document on its sustainability.
The questions, however, would take a separate turn if the whole of north Bengal joins the movement . . .” =
Gorkhaland and only Gorkhaland will be sustainable and we have coherent indicators to prove it. But why should we submit to Sujit (read Kolkata) whom we just do not trust. 61 years is no less a time to convince generations of us that.
We shall lay our cards when the time is ripe and when the agenda on Central Government’s table is Gorkhaland.
UTTAR BANGA JANA JAGARAN MANCH said
DEMANDS OF UTTARBANGA JANA JAGARAN MANCH
1. Both the demands of Sixth Schedule and separate State of Gorkhaland would mean ultimate partition and disintegration of West Bengal. Both the demands should be rejected.
2. Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council may be abolished and the Darjeeling District put directly under state administration, with Army protection.
3. Clause-VII Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 may be repealed to prevent foreign Nepali infiltration.
4. All foreign Nepalese should be identified and pushed back to Nepal, as per the Foreigners Act, 1864 as is being done in the case of illegal Bangladeshi migrants.
5. Border outposts be set up with barbed-wire fencing. Visa be introduced in the Indo-Nepal border as is the case with Bangladesh.
PJ said
@the communal cowards outfit(CCO/ JJM)
no wonder you have barbed wire scars on your backs.
Uttarbanga Jana Jagaran Manch said
We are opposing Gorkhaland or any partition and disintegration of West Bengal. India Government and West Bengal Government must consider the following demands in the interest of SECURITY QUESTION OF INDIA. Nepali infiltration must be stopped and they should be treated as per Bangladeshi migrants. Government must handled the all issues in strong hand.
DEMANDS OF UTTARBANGA JANA JAGARAN MANCH
1. Both the demands of Sixth Schedule and separate State of Gorkhaland would mean ultimate partition and disintegration of West Bengal. Both the demands should be rejected.
2. Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council may be abolished and the Darjeeling District put directly under state administration, with Army protection.
3. Clause-VII Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 may be repealed to prevent foreign Nepali infiltration.
4. All foreign Nepalese should be identified and pushed back to Nepal, as per the Foreigners Act, 1864 as is being done in the case of illegal Bangladeshi migrants.
5. Border outposts be set up with barbed-wire fencing. Visa be introduced in the Indo-Nepal border as is the case with Bangladesh.
Uttarbanga Jana Jagaran Manch said
BIMAL GURUNG IS DIVULGING IN
ANTI-SOCIAL/CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
FROM THE STATESMAN
DARJEELING, July 16: The GJMM chief Mr Bimal Gurung today said that he would go underground for six months to carry out his “non-violent” activities. “I will go underground for six months but not to perpetrate violence. Some elements are posing a hurdle to the Gorkhaland movement. I shall keep these people away in an undisclosed location during my stay underground. They would be released only after Gorkhaland is achieved,” Mr Gurung said. Mr Gurung, however, did not specify when he would go underground or how he would get hold of those proving an impediment to the Gorkhaland struggle. He neither mentioned who all figured in his list as “hurdles” or if his act would be read as kidnap or not by the law. Although he said that the persons he would “keep away,” would be treated well, he did not divulge where he would confine them. The leader’s declaration has caused a stir in the political circle of the Hills.
J T M said
To the Uttarbanga JJ
First i would like to draw yr attention to the fact that there are already too many divisions within—Paschim Banga, UttarBanga, Purba Banga, etc, etc
The Gorkhaland division is the only one based on moral and legitimate grounds to protect the identity of a community getting lost in the Bengalification process.
Yr other divisions are totally based on factors useless to any communal harmony or ethnic preservation
झिल्के said
I would suggest the authors of this article to undergo a course or two on positive thinking or perhaps pranaayam. Better still they should consult a psychiatrist because it appears that paranoia is creeping on them. Take care mates.
Kundan said
Mr Sujit you have rightly asked the question that will the Bengali people of Duars be willing to be ruled and remain as second class citizen in the new state of Gorkhaland.Rightly asked and dont u feel the same argument applies for the Gurkhas of Darjeeling that they are forcefully being ruled and treated as second class citizen in the current Bengal domain Give yourself a thought and avoid putting your foot into your mouth
Atit said
The Gurkhas has played great role in providing independance to Bangladesh. Hundreds of Gurkha soldiers died and became injured in that particular mission which the Bangldeshis will not forget as long as Bangladesh lives and all the credit goes to our Great Nation India.
All the Gurkhas of Darjeeling are Indian Gurkhas like any other Indian Bengali, Bihari, Tamil, Assamese etc and born and educated in Darjeeling India. Darjeeling of course stands within the state of West Bengal where majority of the people speak clean Nepali because Gurkhas are always clean in heart. India as we know is the biggest democracy of the world but democratically the Gurkhas of Darjeeling, Dooars and rest of India does not feel that they have been doing and treated but felt cheated in every respect as well as on their human rights. We respect and do PUJAS to Vedas, Purans, Ramayan, Mahabharat, Koran, Bible, Postak implementing the sayings of these holy books everyday in life and wish to make friends establishing a healthy and reliable community. However trying and trying again over the past 101 years we have achieved NOTHING except let downs and anyone can guess this is because there is something wrong in the system which needs to be changed in a peaceful way KHOON KARABA SE PADOSH HASENGE. There is no need to quote Acts upon Acts to deal a case with your own brothers and sisters just understand why your brother is shouting and discussing reason either he/she is ill treated or you misunderstood him/her, find out the solution SIMPLE isn’t it!
Gorkhaland the issu is to be recognised by the West Bengal Government and Central. The provision of Gorkhaland will not only create a new state within India but will save our Indian Government’s billions of rupees which can be used in building our nation more stronger and beautiful.
Jai Bharatbarsha
J T M said
Well said, atit
YK Shrestha said
Uttarbanga, woh Uttarbanga nahi, Gorkhaland hai!!
Shahensha said
UTTARBANGA JANJAGARAN MANCH ko tod taadke rikshe main daalke le gaya Mahananda pool ke niche jhuggi banaane.
NB said
Hi Guys;
Although Im a strong supporter of Gorkhaland,but not really seeing any progressive development `plan/chart both economic and political makes me feel really worried for my people, as if we may end up in second DGHC with just a few words altered.
Though I was a small child than but I still remember the promises and hope that Ghisingh made and even promised to sacrifice his son if we dont get Gorkha land,but what happend ?What about those people who gave their lives,the family just received five thousand rupees after the formation of DGHC,We made that character into God andhe sold our trust and hope for a few taka to Jyoti babu and it took us another 20 years to sense our freedom.
And many people who were licking Ghisingh for greed yesterday has turned towards Bimal for fear or hope of getting new construction in the near future.I just trust Bimal Gurung but wonder about the central committee around him except a few like Amar lama.Do The planning commitee really have political planning commitee with political executives to excecute them?
I hope the agitation under the new leadership will execute better sytems with real intellectuals not just with a bar of lawyers who has hardly visited the High court too,and afew lectures and teachers who has a knowledge about his subject only but very brief about political planning about Gorkhaland.Otherwise it will just be the change in the handset but with the same sim card,
kamal pradhan said
why do bengalis need bengal, why do punjabis need punjab, why do boros need boroland and why do tibetans need tibet, can uttar banga jan agran manch answer this?
Mukesh Agarwal said
“Darjeeling has seen significant growth in its population during the last century, especially since the 1970s.”
Thats when the Bangladeshis started flooding our areas.
Atit said
Extracted from the Times
Gathering storm in the tea gardens of Darjeeling
As a Gurkha separatist campaign is relaunched, the region’s most famous export is hit by a strike and the eviction of tourists
Jeremy Page in Darjeeling
Tea time at the Darjeeling Planters Club and Major J.S. Rana settles into a wicker chair on the veranda, taking a long slow slurp from his afternoon brew. It is picking season and the club should be crowded with tourists, planters and buyers talking shop or admiring the view over the Himalayan foothills.
Today, however, the terrace is deserted – as are the billiards room and the mess where British planters once devoured 12-course meals, smashing the plates after each one.
“I can’t remember seeing it like this,” says the major, club secretary since 1998. “It’s very worrying.”
There is trouble brewing in Darjeeling, whose unique geography produces some of the world’s most expensive teas. The ethnic Gurkhas (or Gorkhas) in this part of the state of West Bengal have relaunched a campaign to create their own state within India – to be called Gorkhaland. Last month the newly formed Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) called a sporadic general strike, shutting roads and businesses and evicting the tourists who come here to escape the summer heat.
Related Links
No time for tea after Darjeeling strike
Tea pickers starve to death
Tea gardens were exempt but the strike still crippled them by cutting fuel and food supplies and blocking access to markets just as they were picking the crucial “second flush”. The GJM now says that it wants to boot out many of the Indian plantation owners who replaced the British after Indian independence in 1947.
“It’s a question of identity,” Bimal Gurung, the GJM leader, told The Times. “Still today we are beasts of burden. We’ve been labourers for others for 200 years. Now the time’s come for change.”
The one million Gurkhas of Darjeeling have long complained that their Government denies them education and jobs while plundering their natural resources: of 87 tea gardens here, none is Gurkha-owned.
In 1986 Gurkhas began an insurgency that killed 1,200 people – and formed the backdrop of Kiran Desai’s novel The Inheritance of Loss. That ended in 1988 when Subhash Ghising, the leader of the movement, struck a deal allowing Gurkhas limited autonomy through the Darjeeling Gurkha Hill Council. Two decades on, the Gorkhaland movement has been reignited by, of all things, the Indian version of Pop Idol.
Last September a 25-year-old Gurkha policeman called Prashant Tamang entered Indian Idol – and came up against a Bengali in the final. When an Indian radio DJ mocked Mr Tamang as a chowkidar, a disparaging term for a watchman, Darjeeling erupted into protests and violent clashes between Gurkhas and Bengalis.
Misjudging the mood, the elderly Mr Ghising failed to endorse the Gurkhas’ accidental hero. Meanwhile, the more savvy Mr Gurung organised a text-messaging campaign to propel the policeman to victory – and then recruited his young fans to the GJM. Mr Tamang, now recording an album in Bombay, insists that he had no political agenda when he entered the contest, and still has none: “I’m happy I kept the Gurkha name alive. But I don’t interfere in political things.”
Back in Darjeeling, the movement he inadvertently revived has taken on a life of its own. The GJM calls the 1988 deal a betrayal, pointing to the abysmal state of public services and roads, most of which have not been resurfaced in 20 years. Gorkhaland, it says, would focus investment on tea and tourism without public funds being diverted in Calcutta, the capital of West Bengal. Most Gurkhas appear to agree, especially the young, who often have to go to other states or overseas to find work. “However long it takes – we’re ready to pay the price,” Mingma Gyalmo, a 19-year-old Gurkha student from Darjeeling, said.
The GJM insists that it is non-violent, and there will be no repeat of the 1980s, but the Government is taking no chances: last week it called in the army to prevent further clashes between Gurkhas and Bengalis.
The Communist government of West Bengal has reluctantly agreed to hold trilateral talks with the GJM and the central Government, and offered the Hill Council greater powers. However, it remains firmly opposed to Gorkhaland – as does Delhi, anxious not to encourage several other separatist movements in the north east. “We want peace in the hills,” Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, the West Bengal chief minister, said last week. “I have asked the GJM leaders to think if they really need a separate state. I think we can stay together. But yes, Darjeeling needs more development.”
At the heart of the dispute is the tea industry, which supports half of Darjeeling’s 1.6 million people and generates millions of pounds in tax revenues. Darjeeling produces 9.5 million kilograms of tea annually – 2 per cent of Indian production – but output has been stagnant for 20 years because of poor management and outdated labour laws. The GJM says that the solution is to evict negligent plantation owners by revoking their leases, thus giving Gurkhas a chance to buy.
Some in the industry agree but others say that the GJM is only hurting the economy of Darjeeling, including its better-run estates.
Among those affected is Happy Valley, founded in 1854. Closed in 2005 after decades of mismanagement, it reopened in March with new equipment and a deal to supply Harrods – only to be hobbled by the strike, which forced the cancellation of two tea auctions in Calcutta.
Industry leaders say that production will drop by 30 per cent this year because of poor weather and the strikes. “I don’t expect anything like the 1980s,” said R. K. Babycon, deputy head of the Darjeeling Tea Association. “But this has to be resolved soon, or there could be repercussions.”
Indian insurgencies
Kashmir More than 68,000 killed since an Islamic separatist rebellion began in 1989
Assam More than 10,000 killed since a separatist insurgency began in 1979
Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura More than 30 small separatist struggles have left thousands dead since 1947
Punjab Separatist conflict killed several thousand in the 1970s and 1980s
Naxalites Maoist insurgency has killed more than 6,000 since 1967, including 837 last year
Darjeeling Gurkha separatist insurgency killed 1,200 between 1986 and 1988
Source: Times Archive
NB said
Hi Atit,A REALLY GOOD AND INFORMATIVE HIGHLIGHT,
hot4coolbt said
Dear dada from UBJJM,
I do not think you were asked What your demands are either by State Govt. or by Central Govt.
You ppl still have time to behave & Act Otherwise there will be many more Banga Bhangas, to name few Cooch Behar etc. Its time your PATRONS start doing/developing areas irrespecdtive of their voting patterns. I hope you get what i mean here.
For your kind information in last 61 years (after British left) WB Govt. built only 2(Two) numbers of Govt. School in Kolkata.as per UN report There are more than 1 Crore bengalis Illiterate in West-Bengal.
Its time to ACT “ekhon Chita-Bhavana khub holo ekhun kichhu korte hobe” something which you can show. Not pelting STONES i mean
Johnny Gorkha said
UTTARBANGA JANA JAGARAN MANCH please go back to Bangladesh ! Get your visa extended or something, but please don’t overstay your visa so long that you confuse your nationality !
The name you hide under won’t keep you safe for long !
JAI GORKHA JAI GORKHALAND
M Tamang said
No question of separate Gorkhaland: Pranab
Sun, Jun 15 12:40 AM
The Centre stated clearly on Friday that it is against the demand for a separate Gorkhaland state, as put forth by the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM). “We are not in favour of a separate state,” External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said.
Speaking to reporters after the conclusion of the annual general meeting of the Merchants’ Chamber of Commerce, Mukherjee, however, added that the government was willing to hold talks with the GJM provided there were no pre-conditions. Mukherjee also met with West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee for about 10 minutes, during which the latter reportedly convinced Mukherjee that the Centre should neither agree to the Gorkhaland demand nor push Sixth Schedule status for Darjeeling in the Lok Sabha.
With his back to the wall following the GJM’s refusal to talk with the state and its insistence on direct discussions with the Centre, Bhattacharjee is desperate to have the Congress-led UPA government on his side. He explained to Mukherjee that the GJM and its chief, Bimal Gurung, have not been invited to the all-party meet on June 17 since theirs was not a registered political outfit.
The CM however said he was open to have talks with the outfit. Mukherjee mirrored the state’s stand : “The Centre is ready to hold talks with the GJM, but without any preconditions.
And there is no question of a separate state.” Bandh loss Rs 15 cr daily With the GJM calling an indefinite bandh, industry insiders estimate trade and tourism in the region have been hit by losses of Rs15 crore per day.
According to Biswajit Das, general secretary of Federation of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, North Bengal (Focin), the strike in the hills is taking a huge toll on Siliguri’s business community, which is losing nearly Rs 4.5 crore every day. “Darjeeling traders are suffering a loss of Rs 1.5 crore per day.
And Bhutan, Cooch Behar and Jalpaiguri district are losing another Rs 3 crore of revenue because of the frequent bandhs in Bengal,” he said. The frequent bandhs in West Bengal have forced the Sikkim government to carry out a survey into their financial losses, which works out to an estimated Rs 5.9 crore per day.
“The survey done in February 2008 helped us compute the daily loss Sikkim suffered every time NH 31 became out of bounds for Sikkim traffic,” Sikkim tourism secretary, S B S Baduria told Hindustan Times from Gangtok. Highlighting its problems, the Sikkim government has asked the Bengal and Union governments for immediate action.
Birsa Munda said
Don’t sympathise with Gorkhaland
In the summer of 1966, Hope Cooke, the American socialite-turned-Gyalmo, or Queen Consort of the ill-fated 12th Chogyal of Sikkim, created a furore in New Delhi by contesting, in an article published in the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology’s bulletin, India’s possession of Darjeeling that was ‘gifted’ to East India Company by Tsugphud Namgyal. In his book, Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim, Pioneer columnist and former editor of The Statesman Sunanda K Datta-Ray recounts how she argued that “no Sikkimese monarch was empowered to alienate territory”. According to Hope Cooke, Tsugphud Namgyal’s gift to the Company was “in the traditional context of a grant for usufructage only; ultimate jurisdiction, authority and the right to resume the land being implicitly retained”. She claimed Darjeeling’s cession was the “gift of a certain tract for a certain purpose and does not imply the transfer of sovereign rights”. The immediate context of the Gyalmo’s assertion of the Chogyal’s indivisible rights was the web of deceit that was being spun, with more than a little help from the Kazi and other local players, by New Delhi to bring Gangtok within the orbit of its absolute control, converting India’s suzerainty into sovereignty over Sikkim. What happened subsequently is well known: Sikkim was annexed and made a part of the Union of India; the Chogyal was stripped of all powers and died a broken man; and, Hope Cooke, after separating from the Chogyal, returned to the US where she now lives in Brooklyn Heights, New York. These details are inconsequential today. What, however, is relevant is the history of Darjeeling, which is once again in the news, this time because Gorkha settlers are asserting their right to set up a homeland in the three hill divisions — Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Kurseong — apart from Siliguri and the Dooars, which they want to re-christen Gorkhaland.
History tells us how Sikkim’s borders once stretched up to eastern Nepal; how Prithvi Narayan Shah, who welded feuding clans and warring regions into a sprawling kingdom, grabbed Darjeeling; and, how General Ochterlony’s campaign against the Gorkhas resulted in the Treaty of Sugauli (also spelt Segouli) in 1816 when Nepal ceded 10,000 sq km of territory, including Darjeeling, to the East India Company. That’s where history begins and ends for the Gokhas both in Nepal and in India who are clamouring for Gorkhaland: Darjeeling was Nepali territory ceded to the British and, therefore, must now revert back to the Gorkhas.
But history also tells us, much to the discomfort of the champions of Gorkhaland, that the Treaty of Sugauli was followed by the Treaty of Titlya in 1817, whereby the British restored the land between Mechi and Teesta rivers to Sikkim, to which it legitimately belonged. Eighteen years later, the then Chogyal leased Darjeeling to the British who wanted to set up a sanatorium in its soothing, sylvan climes. In the brief lease agreement signed on February 1, 1835, the Chogyal is referred to as the ‘Sikkimputtee Rajah’. The Bengal Gazeteer informs us that in 1841 the East India Company granted the Chogyal a compensation of Rs 3,000; it was later raised to Rs 6,000.
This is how Darjeeling, till then an uninhabited mountain region, came to be inhabited. The British administrators needed ‘natives’ to first build and then maintain the picture postcard town that came up in Darjeeling. Some Bhutias and Lepchas were already there, others came from Sikkim. The demand for labour increased after planters cleared forests for tea gardens and Darjeeling Tea became a source of enormous revenue. The Gorkhas came, as did tribals from what is now Jharkhand, to work as ‘coolies’ in the gardens, plucking leaves and working shifts in the tea-curing and packaging factories. Bengalis sought and found employment as babus (clerks) in the tea gardens, in the municipal administration and other establishments, for example schools set up by missionaries primarily for the children of Anglo-Indian families.
In 1907, the Hillmen’s Association petitioned the British for a separate administrative set-up free from Bengal; the petition was contemptuously ignored, and rightly so. After independence and the reorganisation of States, Darjeeling, along with the Dooars, became a part of West Bengal. Darjeeling has since been designated a separate district, Siliguri is part of Jalpaiguri district in the foothills, and the Dooars are part of Cooch Behar district. The Gorkhas who came and settled in Darjeeling, Siliguri and the Dooars became citizens of India in 1950; a separate Gazette notification was issued to settle this point and remove any doubts about their citizenship.
The status of Darjeeling may have been considered a settled issue by Kolkata and New Delhi, and after Sikkim’s annexation, Gangtok, but not by the Gorkha settlers. In 1986 Mr Subash Ghising launched a violent agitation to press the Gorkha National Liberation Front’s demand for a separate Gorkhaland, citing West Bengal’s “step-motherly” treatment of Darjeeling and “exploitation” of its residents. He was clearly motivated by dreams of helping re-establish ‘Greater Nepal’ by creating a bridge between Nepal and Sikkim. The agitation ended with the signing of an agreement, which resulted in the setting up of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, an elected and empowered body that would look after development-related issues. Mr Ghising failed to deliver and became a Sagina Mahato, putty in the hands of the West Bengal Government and happy to have his snout in the trough.
Cut to 2008: Mr Bimal Gurung, a former associate of Mr Ghising, has parted company with the GNLF and floated his own separatist organisation, the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha, and revived the demand for Gorkhaland. He has audaciously staked claim to the three hill divisions of Darjeeling as well as Siliguri and the Dooars. The revival of the agitation coincides with Maoists — who hope to re-establish the frontiers of Prithvi Narayan Shah’s ‘Greater Nepal’ — coming to power in Kathmandu. Mr Gurung’s agitation has little to do with “local aspirations” of Gorkhas; it is as insidious and dangerous as the assertion of ‘Kashmiriyat’ in Kashmir Valley.
Those who are “sympathetic” to the demand for Gorkhaland would do well to bear in mind that ‘Greater Nepal’ is not only about Nepal expanding its territory in the east up to Teesta, but also recovering the land ceded by Prithvi Narayan Shah which stretches up to Sutlej. If we concede the demand for Gorkhaland, we should be prepared to concede vast tracts of land in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. If the latter is not acceptable, then a third partition of Bengal is equally unacceptable.
BIGGEST QUESTION
The biggest question that romps on the current political situation is that whither goes Darjeeling? Will the state and the Centre ever allow the separation of West Bengal and creation of a new state? If so, at whose cost and for what reason? If not, what will be Gurung’s strategy? Will he follow the path of Ghising for a blood shedding movement? And even if Darjeeling gains its separate statehood, how will it run without having a strong economic backup?
It is anybody’s guess that the Centre will not bow down to the demands of the GJM, considering the demand on ethnic issues. Once the claim is approved,
ethnic issues in other states too will gain momentum and that will be horrible to tackle. This will be a very costly proposition because the base of the movement lies in separatism – the most vulnerable danger before the central government.
Another issue, which is more important, is the demographic situation of Darjeeling. Being a northern border area, Darjeeling has always posed threat of foreign aggression. Leave aside the immigration issues, largely related with illegal intrusion. This threat will mount manifold if Sikkim joins the movement because Sikkim is close to China. China has already claimed a part of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
The claim of Gorkhaland with the inclusion of the Terai and dooars region is a a foolish proposition because this will give birth to serious political trouble and ethnic issues. Communal clashes are also not overruled. Is it believable that the Bengali and Adihibasi population of the Terai and Dooars region who are majorities will accept the rule of the Gorkhas to remain as second class citizens?
There is a danger that if the Gorkhaland demand is conceded, the next step would be to ask for merger with Nepal. We can not support a separate state for a million people based on ethnicity. However, more autonomy can be give to their local affairs by the state government. Delhi alone has a populaton of 150 million. Till how long will you keep carving new states whenever a million people get together and ask for one?
JTM said
ref# 28
‘Those who are “sympathetic” to the demand for Gorkhaland would do well to bear in mind that ‘Greater Nepal’ is not only about Nepal expanding its territory in the east up to Teesta, but also recovering the land ceded by Prithvi Narayan Shah which stretches up to Sutlej. If we concede the demand for Gorkhaland, we should be prepared to concede vast tracts of land in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. If the latter is not acceptable, then a third partition of Bengal is equally unacceptable.’
This point is very important. I have told this to Darjeelingers many a time that if you keep referring to the Treaty of Sugauli for yr authenticity, the rest of the chain of land till Sutlej will also come up. Because The 1815 wars did not just concern Darjeeling. Work out logic to counter this.
Put yourself in the govt’s shoes and prepare your answers. Granting of GL will be considered by India’a national and international perspective. WB is the least of the hurdles.
How will you answer if this query is put up? But I recd no answers except we are a large Nepali speaking pop in Darjeeling. Nobody wants to listen to any advice. In what might appear a problems or negative thinking, I am actually trying to show the way to solutions.
Birsa Munda said
On June 29,the Akhil Bharatiya Adivasi Vikas Parishad had declared at a public meeting in Nagrakata that the tribals would not accept the inclusion of the Terai and Dooars in the Gorkhaland demanded by the Morcha.Because Terai and Dooars have a 75 per cent tribal population and it can not be taken as a part of Gorkhaland.”
Nisha Tamang said
Is this Birsa Munda a chaabi lagako parrot sent all the way from Bangladesh..kick him out!
Silgarhi,Dooars,Bhaktinagar said
If the so-called Birsa Munda has so much of problem, then he can go to Jharkhand.
Nisha Tamang said
Exactly! Jharkand ma basera ON JUNE 29TH..ON JUNE 29TH..ON JUNE 29TH bhandai maros!
UTTAR BANGA JANA JAGARAN MANCH said
The Siliguri Corridor
Question Mark on Security
By : Pinaki Bhattacharya
(Pinaki Bhattacharya is a Special Correspondent with Mathrubhumi, and is based in Kolkata, covering West Bengal and the Northeast)
A critical futuristic threat perception vis-à-vis India’s North Eastern region has long preoccupied many analysts and the Indian security establishment. The projected exercise would involve Pakistan launching an attack on Jammu and Kashmir. At the other end, China would engage India militarily in the latter’s Northeast with movement from Tibet, through Bhutan and via Alipurduar in the Jalpaiguri district and consequently cut-off what is referred to as the eastern chicken’s neck or the Shiliguri corridor. An Indian strategists’ nightmare come true. A possibility that was touched upon in the recently published novel by a former BBC journalist, Humphrey Hawksley, called Dragon Fire.
In such a projected war scenario, while India battles Pakistan and China, behind the lines of the security forces guarding the narrow strip of land called the Shiliguri corridor, which at its narrowest is 20 kilometres long and just 20 kilometres wide in the general area south west of Shiliguri, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the Bodos, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation and other subversives trained in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan raise attrition to a feverish pitch. China could, it is projected, choose to cut the chicken’s neck with irreversible consequences vis-à-vis India’s Northeast.
A reasonable assumption of this nature reportedly influenced a group of senior Indian security officials to meet in May 2000.1 The meeting concluded that a constant vigil needed to be maintained at the Bagdogra airport in Jalpaiguri and railway stations like New Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar, as also at Kishanganj and Katihar in the State of Bihar. Such a constant vigil was directed towards monitoring the movement of those who are rather quaintly called ANEs (anti-national elements). The meeting also resolved that a joint operation of Assam and West Bengal police needs to be launched to flush out terrorists, besides beefing up the deployment of security forces.
In case such hostilities actually broke out, one of the crucial Chinese objectives would be to capture a large amount of territory in northern Sikkim to secure a strategic hold. In tactical terms, this would translate into denying a launching pad to the Indian forces for an assault on Tibet. The other element of this thrust, it is projected, would be centred on capturing areas in Bhutan – the ones traditionally claimed by the Chinese – thus posing a direct threat to the Shiliguri Corridor, a key item on the agenda.2
The Shiliguri Corridor3 is an area of 12,203 square kilometers connecting mainland India with the outlying border States of the Northeast. An intelligence report of one of security forces operating in the area states: “As geographical configuration puts the North Eastern States of our country at a disadvantage for a lack of strategic depth, considered necessary to provide a buffer, the tenuous lines of communication (that run through this corridor) connect mainland India to the Northeast.” The corridor’s dimensions extend lengthwise approximately 200 kms with a width varying between 20 and 60 kilometres. It houses the all-important feeder highways number NH 31 and 31a and the North Frontier Railways.
During the Sino-Indian war in 1962, a division-strength of troops was moved in record time from Punjab to Shiliguri in order to protect north Bengal and Sikkim from the advancing Chinese. The Chinese were pressing ahead of the Tawang sub-division of what is now known as Arunachal Pradesh, which the Indian troops had vacated. The Chinese were also found to be amassing troops across Sikkim. As Pakistan had terminated river traffic through the then East Pakistan, all supplies for Assam had to be routed through railways from Katihar in Bihar to Baminigaon via the corridor, where the Brahmaputra river needed to be crossed by ferry.
The corridor is also significant in light of the vital installations located around it, like the airfields of Hashimara and Bagdogra, and the oil pipelines, which run through the corridor. These installations are considered to be lethal sabotage targets for insurgent groups lurking behind the lines of defence.
One of the key borders that abut the corridor is with Nepal, stretching 144 kilometres on the other side of north Bengal. Being unmanned, the long stretch of the border proves immensely conducive for infiltration and also as a point of egress for ANEs originating in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Furthermore, the Indo-Nepal Friendship treaty of 1950, which guarantees free and unhindered movement of Nepalese citizens between the two nations, has been handy for infiltration exercises. The absence of security forces on the Indo-Nepal border also attracts agents of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the external intelligence agency of Pakistan, and their co-conspirators to opt for various clandestine, or even occasionally, regular or open routes in the area. Of course, in legal terms, while the Nepalese and the Bhutanese can enter and exit at any point on the border, the other nationals are required to adopt only an authorised route, which also acts as the trade route between India and Nepal. In practice, however, there is little to prevent the ANEs from crossing over at any point, virtually of their choice.
It is only in recent times that the Indian security apparatus has become aware of the situation on the Indo-Nepal border. According to reports, the Group of Ministers that scrutinised the Madhav Godbole Committee Report on border management has recommended that the 1,751-km border be policed by the paramilitary force, the Special Service Bureau (SSB)4. According to news reports, the Godbole report critically analysed issues related to “border-fencing, safeguarding of air space, checking infiltration and smuggling activities, restructuring of para-military forces guarding the borders and adoption of modern technology as a force multiplier.”5 The group, headed by the Union Home Minister, L K Advani, has also suggested that the SSB’s armed wing be brought under the command and control of the Union Home Ministry to counter smuggling and ISI activities originating in Nepal.6
According to premier intelligence agencies, the Shiliguri corridor faces threat not only from this pattern of free movement of personnel and goods through the border areas, but also from insurgents operating from Bhutan and particularly in Assam. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) militants have been using the corridor for their movement for a long time. The recent emergence of another insurgent outfit, called the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO),7 in north Bengal, is adding to the worries of the security forces. Intelligence reports indicate that, in 1993, certain members of the Rajbongshi community belonging to the ranks of the All Kamtapur Students’ Union (AKSU) approached ULFA cadres in the Kokrajhar district of Assam and sought arms training from them. They were primarily directing their efforts towards organising an armed struggle for realising their demand of a separate Kamtapur State, carved out of the districts of north Bengal. Following their contact, 12 Rajbongshi youth were allowed to be trained in a training camp organised by the ULFA in Bhutan to the north of the trijunction of Bhutan-West Bengal-Assam. The training could not be completed due to a constant threat from the security forces and also because certain ULFA cadres had surrendered.
The Rajbongshi leadership, primarily the AKSU, however, continued their efforts. They contacted some members of the central leadership of ULFA, who in turn agreed to train them on the condition that they form a secessionist outfit. This led to the formation of the KLO. Members of the newly formed KLO were imparted arms training during 1996-97 in Samdrup Jhankar in Bhutan where the central headquarters of ULFA is situated.8 The KLO also established its headquarters near the ULFA HQ at Samdrup Jhankar. The ULFA’s agenda was to prop up the Rajbongshi militants for its own gains, and the West Bengal tribals were aiding the outfit to create safe havens in North Bengal.9 The trained KLO cadres, on their return from Bhutan mingled with the activists of the Kamtapur Peoples’ Party (KPP) and AKSU, and have been working with them. An estimated 100 KLO terrorists have received arms training at the Gelengphu and Kalaikhola camps in Bhutan, and reports also indicate that the ULFA and KLO had reached an agreement to launch a joint armed struggle.10 The movement for Kamtapur has thus turned violent with sporadic incidents of looting, extortion, killings and sabotage. Of late, the KLO and the ULFA have started an extortion drive targeting the local tea gardens.11 They are most active in Alipurduar in Jalpaiguri and Shiliguri sub-division of Darjeeling.
Reports indicate that a large number of KLO cadres have received arms training at the ULFA camps in neighbouring Bhutan.12 There are also reports of growing terrorist and subversive activities by the KLO in league with ULFA militants. Pakistan-trained and ISI-backed ULFA insurgents are reported to have imparted arms training to three successive batches of KLO insurgents. Of the three KLO batches, one was trained in a forest in Jalpaiguri district, while the other two were trained in Bhutan.13 The arrest of a KLO activist from Matabhanga on May 29, 2001 exposed the linkages between KLO and ULFA and the training structures in the corridor.14 Earlier, three KLO insurgents arrested from Cooch Behar on December 8, 2000, confessed to having undergone advanced arms training in the ULFA camp in the Fifshu jungles of Bhutan.15 According to official sources, they were part of a 60-strong batch of KLO and ULFA cadre, who had received advanced arms training between April 15 and July 15, 2000, at ULFA’s Nichula area command camp.16 In certain instances, KLO militants have been reported to sneak into Assam after committing violent activities in West Bengal. The ULFA cadres are reportedly entering the plains of Bengal from the Kumargram village on the borders of Bengal, Assam and Bangladesh, to train KLO insurgents.17 ULFA cadres have been using north Bengal as a transit point to go from Bhutan to Bangladesh and vice versa, while some militants have also crossed over to Nepal through this area.18 The ULFA militants often visit north Bengal for medical attention and there are reports that ULFA cadres also use the area to transport arms and ammunition to their camps in Bhutan.19
The forests on the border of the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan with West Bengal also provide ample space for the insurgent groups to operate. The recent encounter20 between security forces and the Gorkha Liberation Organisation (GLO), a radical breakaway faction of the Subhash Ghising-led Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), cadres in the Tinkatari jungles provides ample testimony of the preparedness of the insurgents in the area, as also their growing co-ordination with various groups, particularly with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland –Issak Muivah (NSCN-IM). The attempted assassination21 of the Gorkha leader, Subhash Ghising, while he was returning to Darjeeling after a meeting with Union Home Minister Advani is an indicator of this collusion. The attack is widely believed to be the handiwork of Chhatre Subba, a one-time Ghising protege who has turned against the GNLF supremo for his purported betrayal of the Gorkhaland cause. One of the slain assailants was also identified as an NSCN-IM member. And the fact that the other team members were reported to have fled to Nepal is indicative of a broader conspiracy. The NSCN-IM is also allegedly training certain Gorkha and Nepali youths.22 Two NSCN-IM cadres were killed in an encounter in the Shamsingh forest in Darjeeling district on November 12, 2000.23 According to intelligence sources in Shiliguri, the NSCN-IM cadres were part of an instructors’ group that had travelled to West Bengal to impart arms and explosives handling training to the GLO.
Reports also suggest that the ISI was supplying a large quantity of arms and ammunition to the various Northeast terrorist outfits from the stockpiles of the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia after their defeat and eventual obliteration.24 These were picked up from the markets of Thailand and were transported to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, eventually to be used on Indian soil. The arms were shipped from Thai ports to Cox’s Bazaar and were then carried on headloads for rest of the way.25 The recipients were the NSCN-IM, ULFA and the Bodo groups.
The NSCN-IM has gradually become the primary militant outfit in the region, providing training and resources to various other groups. Recently, however, the Myanmarese authorities initiated a crackdown on the terrorist groups operating from their soil in the area. Media reports have indicated that an NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) camp was attacked by Myanmarese and Indian security forces in the Konyak region of Myanmar, adjacent to Nagaland.26 Earlier, in October 2000, a botched operation of the Myanmar Army caused the death of five Assam Rifles personnel during an encounter with the Khaplang group cadres.27 Evidently, this mounting pressure has made the NSCN-K amenable to a cease-fire, which the Indian government offered recently.
Reports indicate that while there are no training camps of the ULFA and NSCN in Coochbehar and Alipurduar, there are indications that Bodo militants have their training camps in the adjoining areas at the tri-junction of these two districts with Bhutan, in the jungles of Kalikhola in that country. The security forces have arrested certain couriers transporting ration and also ascertained the frequent movement of Bodo militants along the banks of the Sankosh river near Kalikhola. Terrorist training camps in Bhutan also exist in the areas of Goberkundi, south of Udang river, Lungkhavgma, Merungphuc, Sukhini and Dinsing river. Even though these areas do not abut the Jalpaiguri district, arrested militants have confessed to having obtained training in these areas. An ULFA terrorist, Tarani Biasya, arrested in Alipurduar on February 9, 1998, had confessed to having been trained in Sukhini. These militants often transport small arms from Bangladesh to Bhutan through the Shiliguri Corridor on trucks that transport goods to and from Bangladesh, inducing the truck drivers and owners by threats and money.
Shiliguri town is a gateway to Guwahati in Assam, Gangtok in Sikkim and Kishengunj in Bihar. It also shares borders with three countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The town’s cosmopolitan character, grown out of it being “an island of prosperity,” makes it easier for outsiders to get assimilated into the local populace, thus providing perfect cover to the subversives. In fact, the West Bengal government had admitted on the floor of the State Legislative Assembly in 1999 that the Shiliguri corridor ran the risk of being sabotaged by ISI agents. This was admitted by the then Deputy Chief Minister and Minister in-charge for Home, while responding to the Opposition’s charges following a bomb blast at New Jalpaiguri Station of north Bengal on June 22, 1999. Some 10 persons, including two Indian Army personnel bound for Kargil, were killed and more than 80 persons injured in the incident.28
Security agencies are also concerned at the mushrooming growth of mosques and madrassas (religious seminaries) in the region. According to their estimate, in the last five years the total number of madrassas that have come up in the Shiliguri Corridor area are as follows: Coochbehar – 45, Jalpaiguri – 44, Shiliguri – 63 and Islampur sub-division, North 5, Dinajpur – 467. Of these only 23 in Coochbehar are recognized by the West Bengal government; eight in Jalpaiguri; two in Shiliguri and seven in Islampur. Yet, the others are flourishing with no dearth of funds. Intelligence sources suspect that people having linkages with Pakistan-based terrorist outfits have set up at least some of these mosques and madrassas.
Intelligence reports also state that the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) – renamed as Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM) – and active in Jammu and Kashmir, has spread its tentacles in the region, with Nepal and northern West Bengal as their preferred ground. It is reportedly spreading Muslim fundamentalism and establishing a string of bases in the Northeast, as also in northern West Bengal. The HuA is reported to have succeeded in raising a large number of supporters in the Dangipara area of Shiliguri town, as also in adjoining areas like Naxalbari, Fulbari, etc.
According to intelligence sources, another organisation called Tabligh-e-Jamaat is also reported to be active around the Shiliguri Corridor. They hold regular meetings along Champasari and Bardhaman Road near Hawra camp in Shiliguri and are also in contact with the Harkat-ul-Ansar in Nepal. There are also indications of close linkages between the two groups, with senior members of each attending the meetings of the other. Although the activity of the organisation is discreet, it reportedly includes anti-India propaganda, ‘universalisation’ of Islam and raising funds for ‘Islamic causes.’
Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar districts, which constitute the Coochbehar sector of the corridor, are bounded by the Bhutan border in the north, starting from Phuntsholing to Kalikhola tri-junction, and are also contiguous with 410 kilometres of international border with Bangladesh. To the east from Kalikhola the boundary runs south along the western bank of the Sankosh River, parallel to Kokrajhar and Dhubri districts in Assam. From the Bangladesh border, there are three points where the Bhutan border is at a distance of approximately 60 kilometres. This area not only has NH 31 and NH 31A running through it, but also has broad-gauge and metre-gauge railway lines passing through before entering Assam. The demographic character of the area along the Bhutan border comprises Santhals, Bodos, Nepalis and Rajbongshis. In the Cooch Behar sector live the Bengali Hindus, Rajbongshis, Bengali and Bihari Muslims. Rajbongshis, Bengali Hindus and Muslims live in the areas along the Bangladesh border.
The demographic profile within a 5-kilometre belt of the international border with Bangladesh has undergone rapid changes. According to intelligence sources, in Jalpaiguri district, while the population of Hindus and Muslims has been 1,35,938 and 1,63,522 respectively in 1981, in 1991 it rose to 1,90,805 and 2,35,733 respectively. In Coochbehar, the figure in 1981 was 2,17,588 and 1,41,001 respectively; while in 1991 it was 2,94,038 and 1,85,528 respectively. In the Shiliguri sub-division of Darjeeling district, the numbers were 48,110 and 71,215, respectively, in 1981; while in 1991, they were 72,518 and 1,12.302, respectively. In the Islampur and Raigunj sub-divisions of north Dinajpur, they were 1,78,583 and 2,60,507, respectively, in 1981; rising to 2,51,472 and 3,41,325, respectively, in 1991.
In early 1999, a media report had indicated that a significant demographic transformation was occurring around the Corridor, causing serious concern among security agencies. The report, quoting official sources, pointed out that, while in 1971 the Muslim population was 15 per cent, in recent years it has touched a high of 70 per cent in some areas, primarily due to illegal immigration from Bangladesh. The report referred to the phenomenon of a large number of Muslim immigrants residing in Islampur of North Dinajpur district as also Kishangunj of Bihar. The report had also claimed that untrammelled passage through these areas was available to the thousands of Bihari Muslims who claim Pakistan’s nationality but remain in Bangladesh because the former refuses to take them in.29
Given the criticality of threat perceptions, one needs to discern the reasons for such an apparent laxity in vigil. It is plausible to seek explanations in the tradition of thin policing of the borders in the area. Security force levels in the Cooch Behar sector30 consist of four units of the Border Security Force (BSF) deployed along the 410 km of the international border, from border post number 814 to 1001; on the Assam-Bhutan border, a three-company strength of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is deployed. The West Bengal Armed Police maintains a platoon and an Army unit is deployed in Cooch Behar, but is not assigned internal security duty. SSB companies are also deployed in Tufanganj, Natuarpur and Hindusthan, and in other areas in the sector. The configuration of intelligence agencies in the area has the Intelligence Bureau at the apex followed by the Field Intelligence Units (FIU) of the Army, SSB and the BSF. Efforts are currently being directed towards seeking a unified effort and greater co-ordination in operations of the security forces.
One of the key security concerns of the area is gunrunning. According to a media report, there were two routes through which this lucrative trade was being conducted. In the first, arms were first sent to certain safe havens in Shiliguri and later dispatched in small quantities by local couriers who would typically travel by road or rail. Consignments were then loaded on Dooars-bound buses heading towards Jaigaon on the Indo-Bhutan border. Gunrunners also utilise the metre-gauge railway line between Shiliguri and Alipurduar via Hashimara and Birpara. They are then transferred to hideouts in the Jayanti hills in the north or Alipurduar in the south.31 The other preferred route is through the riverine tri-junction in Kishangunj in the Coochbehar district of West Bengal. The loads are ferried by country boats at night and later transported in small numbers by local carriers to Islamabad in Madarihat and Falakata in the Jalpaiguri district.
Another cause for concern for the security apparatus is the growing nexus between the militant groups and illegal timber traders. Along the Assam-West Bengal border, timber trading is a lucrative business due its high demand in West Bengal and in other parts of the country. Various sawmills in the area north of Bakshirhat in Cooch Behar are reported to be recipients of smuggled timber, including teak and sesame wood, from Assam. Sawmill owners enjoy the patronage of terrorist outfits based in Assam, who in turn extort large sums of money from them in return for security. In their operations, the militants also utilise various modes of transport like trucks, mini vans and motorcycles owned by the sawmill owners. Recent developments show that the Bodo militants, as also the ULFA, have shifted base to the forests of Bhutan, traversing from their earlier safe houses in Bangladesh. At the narrowest point in the region, the distance between the Bhutan border and the Bangladesh border is a mere 60 kilometres. And considering the fact that the Cooch Behar sector is relatively calm, it is policed lightly. Furthermore, there are no mobile checkposts in the region to challenge any movement of suspicious nature.
Intelligence agencies fear that many key installations in the Shiliguri Corridor are liable to sabotage by militants. Such installations include the bridge on the national highway near Barovisha in Darjeeling district, the railway-bridge over river Raidhak, the bridge connecting the national highway and the railway-bridge over Sankosh River.
Before 1947, the North Eastern States, especially Assam, were connected with the mainland through waterways, road and railway networks running through what was then a part of the Bengal Presidency and later named East Pakistan and, eventually, Bangladesh. Thus, linkages between that country and the Assamese were deep, and these, the ISI later sought to exploit. In fact, a Foreign Service officer of Bangladesh, Mohammad Siddique, has claimed that “India had received the corridor at Shiliguri, though Bangladesh (i.e. the then East Pakistan) had more claims over the territory because of population characteristics.”32
Such a mindset has created worries in the security establishment, and these were articulated by the former Director of the Intelligence Bureau and former Governor of West Bengal, T V Rajeshwar: “It is not Kashmir alone which should cause anxiety. The Bangladeshi infiltration, which continues unabated, has changed the demographic pattern of eastern India. There is a grave danger to the Shiliguri Corridor, which is the lifeline of the seven North Eastern states and Sikkim, because of the concentration of the Bangladeshi migrants there. Bengal’s premier in 1946, Nizamuddin, wrote to Governor R.G. Casey that Bengal would soon become a Muslim majority province if left undisturbed. Even if his dream was belied because of the Partition, Dr. Henry Kissinger’s foreboding of a Muslim majority state emerging from within Indian borders is there to contend with.”33
Thus, it is evident that the Shiliguri Corridor faces major threats in its geographical vicinity from the overbearing Chinese presence as also from relatively minor neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Furthermore, the overarching consideration in the security framework is the ability of Pakistan to subvert the regimes in these countries and consequently increase insurgent pressures in the area.
Since the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the architect of Bangladesh and its first Premier, every regime in that country has fostered anti-Indian forces within its territorial ambit. Indeed, Begum Khaleda Zia, the current Premier, had gone to the extent of calling the Northeast insurgents, “freedom fighters.”34 The crucial leverage that Bangladesh has gained in its endeavour to create instability in India at a low cost is the large number of its own people residing on Indian soil. The Bangladeshis have a novel way of ‘legalising’ their immigration in India. The relatives who are in India reportedly get the names of those across the border included in the voters’ list during enumeration. As their names finally appear in the list, messages are then sent across to them to finally cross over. It is this population that reportedly creates a buffer of non-combatants for the militants and they utilise them as perfect cover.
Even though an Indian protectorate, the Royal Kingdom of Bhutan has, in the recent past, played host to ULFA and Bodo militants, who have found a comfortable habitat in the southern part of the country. In fact, some reports claim that captured ULFA cadres have vouched to witnessing three visits by the King of Bhutan to their camps. However, recent reports reveal that the Bhutanese government has commenced fortification of its borders with Assam, ostensibly to deter the free passage of militants. They have reportedly deployed 3,000 troops on the border and are planning to put more forces on the ground.35 But the King and the government indicate marked reluctance to engage the militants on the grounds that “We are not sure of the kind of support these militant groups enjoy in Assam and in case there is an armed conflict between the Bhutanese security forces and the militants, it would have a major impact on the country’s economy and its age-old relations between the people of Bhutan and Assam would be seriously affected. It may take many years before the relations normalised.”36
Certain analysts perceive eastern Nepal, bordering the Shiliguri Corridor, to be the springboard for Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in the Northeast. Nepal’s proximity to this passage assumes significance because of its strategic importance. Bound by Nepal and Bangladesh in the south, the use of this passage for transferring small arms and contraband from both the countries is now well established.37
The fact that Nepal has been open to subversion by ISI operatives is also beyond dispute. Yakoob Memon, one of the accused in the 1993 Mumbai blast case, was traced in Nepal,38 and then the infamous IC-814 hijacking had its origins at the Tribhuvan International Airport, causing substantial damage to bilateral relations between India and Nepal, which took some effort in mending. But the fact that the Nepalese are not adopting a laid-back attitude about taking actions against those who are using their territory for launching anti-India campaigns is evident in the recent arrest and incarceration of a senior Pakistani diplomat, who was found in possession of large quantities of explosives.39
In 1962, when the Chinese had begun their troop concentration across the border, Indian security planners were rightly worried about the possible threat to eastern India. This had led to a decision to withdraw troops from the Punjab border with Pakistan and mass them in Shiliguri focusing on the area of the Corridor. This was a difficult decision to make because intelligence agencies were suspicious of General Ayub Khan’s intentions. Yet, the then Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, had obtained the necessary clearance from the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to move troops from the Northwest to the East.40
One may take note that the Kamtapur Peoples’ Party (KPP), which contested the recent elections to the State Legislative Assembly in West Bengal, had failed to secure a significant mandate. Receiving an average of seven per cent of the total votes polled, the KPP has been humbled in vast tracts of North Bengal, which it wants to be a part of their ‘new State’ of Kamtapur. But now that they have failed to secure democratic sanction for themselves that could have validated their demand by providing numerical muscle, what will the party’s next agenda be? There exists a sense of collective denial about the existence of any insurgent action committed by anyone attached to the movement for a separate Kamtapur.41 Almost to a man, the KPP leadership has refused to acknowledge the existence of the KLO, even as the security agencies were equally insistent about its threatening presence.
In the light of these developments, it is imperative to critically scrutinise the significance of the Shiliguri Corridor and to initiate steps to render it safe in the larger interest of maintaining the sovereign security and integrity of the region as also of the nation.
——————————————————————————–
ENDNOES
# Pinaki Bhattacharya is a Special Correspondent with Mathrubhumi, and is based in Kolkata, covering West Bengal and the Northeast.
The meeting took place in Assam. Source: Intelligence reports.
“Evaluation of the Chinese Threat”, See http://www.indiavotes.com/columns1/2001feb2-tksludra.html
The corridor comprises Islampur sub-division of Darjeeling district, Jalpaiguri Sadar and Alipurduar sub-divisions of Jalpaiguri district and Toofanganj, Mathabhanga, Coochbehar Sadar, Dinhata and Mekhliganj sub-divisions of Coochbehar district.
Based on the report of the Kargil Review Committee chaired by K Subrahmanyam, the then Convenor of the National Security Advisory Board, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee constituted a Group of Cabinet Ministers (GoM) in April 2000 to review the national security system and to formulate specific proposals for implementation. The GoM set up four task forces, one each for intelligence apparatus, border management, internal security and management of defence. Madhav Godbole, a former Home Secretary, headed the task force on border management. He submitted a 499-page report to the GoM, headed by erstwhile Union Home Minister L.K. Advani.
See “Ministerial group gets report on border management”, http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/20000830/ina30040.html; The Godbole report recommended that paramilitary forces such as the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and Assam Rifles should man international borders, but operate directly under the army in cases where the boundary line is unsettled or under dispute.
The Telegraph, Kolkata, December 11, 2000
The Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) was formed in 1995 by the Koch-Rajbongshi tribes to carve out a separate Kamatapur State, comprising six north Bengal districts and Goalpara district in lower Assam through an armed struggle. For a profile of the KLO, see South Asia Terrorism Portal; India; Terrorist Groups; Assam; KLO; http://www.satp.org
“WB separatists woo Assam tribals” http://www.northeastvigil.com/newsarch/01121999i.htm
Ibid. The decision to prop up Rajbongshi rebel outfits was taken by the ULFA in December 1995 at the initiative of Raju Baruah, a senior leader of the ULFA’s military wing. Subsequently, the ULFA entrusted the then chairman of its Darrang district unit, Ajit Kachari, with the task of setting up the Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO) in Lower Assam. Simultaneously, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) was formed in North Bengal following a meeting at Kumargram. The first batch of 25 KRLO members went to the ULFA camps in Bhutan for training in December 1995.
“India: ULFA, KLO to launch joint movement in Assam”. Both the outfits also decided to indulge in joint extortion drives in Assam. This decision was taken at a meeting in Bhutan in July 2001. http://www.satp.org/news/2001/August/news23.htm
“India: North Bengal turning into hotbed of militancy”, http://www.satp.org/news/November/news%2014.htm#8
See South Asia Terrorism Portal ; India; Terrorist Groups; Assam; KLO; http://www.satp.org
“West Bengal seeks more forces” http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/09wb.htm
“Kamtapur-Ne Nexus Uncovered”, http://www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1010531/national.htm#head2
“Ominous Kamtapur Nexus Unearthed”, http://www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1001210/front_pa.htm#head2
Ibid. Nichula base is adjacent to Kalikhola on the Indo-Bhutan border north of Uttar Haldibari. The camp, reportedly, is approximately 8 km north of Allay bust, the last Bhutanese border village, inside the Fifshu jungle.
“Separatist movement in North Bengal gets Ulfa help”, http://www.news.india-today.com/ntoday/newsarchives/100/12/10/n133.shtml
“Bengal CM cautions against ultras”, http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ne.htm
Ibid.
Two suspected militants were killed in an encounter with police at Tinkatari near Samshing, close to the Bhutan border on November 12, 2000. Those killed were reportedly cadres of the Gorkha Liberation Organisation. One security force personnel was killed and another injured during the encounter. See “Naga ultras killed in shootout”, Statesman, Kolkata, November 13, 2000.
On February 9, 2001, militants armed with sophisticated rifles and grenades attacked Ghising’s convoy bound for Darjeeling from Shiliguri on a narrow and winding mountain road. See “Thunder in the hills”, Hindu, Chennai, February 18, 2001. Subba was arrested on March 23, 2001 near the Indo-Nepal border.
“Stealthily, a rebel Gorkha group builds a base”, http://news.india-today.com/ntoday/newsarchives/100/11/28/n52.shtml.
“Bengal CM cautions against ultras”, http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ne.htm
“Ultra Getting Arms from Khmer Rouge”, http://piglet.uccs.edu/~kalita/assam/news/1997/1997-11-25.html, See also “ISI training outfits in camps across Bangladesh”, http://www.northeastvigil.com/newsarch/16052000i.htm#i06
See South Asia Terrorism Portal; India; Assessment; http://www.satp.org
Times of India, New Delhi, May 19, 2001.
Indiainfo.com, October 26, 2000.
Pioneer, New Delhi, June 23, 1999. Also see “The Islamization of West Bengal”, http://www.swordoftruth.com/swordoftruth/archives/byauthor/dhruvajyotibarua/ tiowb.html
Times of India, February 15, 1999.
Intelligence sources.
Telegraph, December 13, 2000.
“Kathmandu Revisited”, People’s Review, Kathmandu, August 7, 1997.
T.V Rajeshwar, “The Lessons of Kosovo”, Hindu, May 5, 1999.
Sreeradha Dutta, Security of India’s Northeast: External Linkages”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, November 2000, Vol. XXIV No. 8, p. 1506.
Times of India, May 19, 2001.
Times of India, April 16, 2001.
Hindu, September 8, 1999.
Dutta, “Security of India’s Northeast”, p. 1506.
Police in Kathmandu arrested a senior Pakistani diplomat Mohammad Arshad with 16 kg of RDX on April 12, 2001. According to official sources, the arrested diplomat, the first secretary in the Pakistani Embassy, was due to return to his country after a posting in Nepal. See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailsmall_news.asp?date1=4/13/2001&id=7
B.N. Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal, Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971, p. 382.
This was made evident during the writer’s visit to the region.
UTTAR BANGA JANA JAGARAN MANCH said
The Siliguri Corridor
Question Mark on Security
By : Pinaki Bhattacharya
(Pinaki Bhattacharya is a Special Correspondent with Mathrubhumi, and is based in Kolkata, covering West Bengal and the Northeast)
A critical futuristic threat perception vis-à-vis India’s North Eastern region has long preoccupied many analysts and the Indian security establishment. The projected exercise would involve Pakistan launching an attack on Jammu and Kashmir. At the other end, China would engage India militarily in the latter’s Northeast with movement from Tibet, through Bhutan and via Alipurduar in the Jalpaiguri district and consequently cut-off what is referred to as the eastern chicken’s neck or the Shiliguri corridor. An Indian strategists’ nightmare come true. A possibility that was touched upon in the recently published novel by a former BBC journalist, Humphrey Hawksley, called Dragon Fire.
In such a projected war scenario, while India battles Pakistan and China, behind the lines of the security forces guarding the narrow strip of land called the Shiliguri corridor, which at its narrowest is 20 kilometres long and just 20 kilometres wide in the general area south west of Shiliguri, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the Bodos, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation and other subversives trained in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan raise attrition to a feverish pitch. China could, it is projected, choose to cut the chicken’s neck with irreversible consequences vis-à-vis India’s Northeast.
A reasonable assumption of this nature reportedly influenced a group of senior Indian security officials to meet in May 2000.1 The meeting concluded that a constant vigil needed to be maintained at the Bagdogra airport in Jalpaiguri and railway stations like New Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar, as also at Kishanganj and Katihar in the State of Bihar. Such a constant vigil was directed towards monitoring the movement of those who are rather quaintly called ANEs (anti-national elements). The meeting also resolved that a joint operation of Assam and West Bengal police needs to be launched to flush out terrorists, besides beefing up the deployment of security forces.
In case such hostilities actually broke out, one of the crucial Chinese objectives would be to capture a large amount of territory in northern Sikkim to secure a strategic hold. In tactical terms, this would translate into denying a launching pad to the Indian forces for an assault on Tibet. The other element of this thrust, it is projected, would be centred on capturing areas in Bhutan – the ones traditionally claimed by the Chinese – thus posing a direct threat to the Shiliguri Corridor, a key item on the agenda.2
The Shiliguri Corridor3 is an area of 12,203 square kilometers connecting mainland India with the outlying border States of the Northeast. An intelligence report of one of security forces operating in the area states: “As geographical configuration puts the North Eastern States of our country at a disadvantage for a lack of strategic depth, considered necessary to provide a buffer, the tenuous lines of communication (that run through this corridor) connect mainland India to the Northeast.” The corridor’s dimensions extend lengthwise approximately 200 kms with a width varying between 20 and 60 kilometres. It houses the all-important feeder highways number NH 31 and 31a and the North Frontier Railways.
During the Sino-Indian war in 1962, a division-strength of troops was moved in record time from Punjab to Shiliguri in order to protect north Bengal and Sikkim from the advancing Chinese. The Chinese were pressing ahead of the Tawang sub-division of what is now known as Arunachal Pradesh, which the Indian troops had vacated. The Chinese were also found to be amassing troops across Sikkim. As Pakistan had terminated river traffic through the then East Pakistan, all supplies for Assam had to be routed through railways from Katihar in Bihar to Baminigaon via the corridor, where the Brahmaputra river needed to be crossed by ferry.
The corridor is also significant in light of the vital installations located around it, like the airfields of Hashimara and Bagdogra, and the oil pipelines, which run through the corridor. These installations are considered to be lethal sabotage targets for insurgent groups lurking behind the lines of defence.
One of the key borders that abut the corridor is with Nepal, stretching 144 kilometres on the other side of north Bengal. Being unmanned, the long stretch of the border proves immensely conducive for infiltration and also as a point of egress for ANEs originating in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Furthermore, the Indo-Nepal Friendship treaty of 1950, which guarantees free and unhindered movement of Nepalese citizens between the two nations, has been handy for infiltration exercises. The absence of security forces on the Indo-Nepal border also attracts agents of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the external intelligence agency of Pakistan, and their co-conspirators to opt for various clandestine, or even occasionally, regular or open routes in the area. Of course, in legal terms, while the Nepalese and the Bhutanese can enter and exit at any point on the border, the other nationals are required to adopt only an authorised route, which also acts as the trade route between India and Nepal. In practice, however, there is little to prevent the ANEs from crossing over at any point, virtually of their choice.
It is only in recent times that the Indian security apparatus has become aware of the situation on the Indo-Nepal border. According to reports, the Group of Ministers that scrutinised the Madhav Godbole Committee Report on border management has recommended that the 1,751-km border be policed by the paramilitary force, the Special Service Bureau (SSB)4. According to news reports, the Godbole report critically analysed issues related to “border-fencing, safeguarding of air space, checking infiltration and smuggling activities, restructuring of para-military forces guarding the borders and adoption of modern technology as a force multiplier.”5 The group, headed by the Union Home Minister, L K Advani, has also suggested that the SSB’s armed wing be brought under the command and control of the Union Home Ministry to counter smuggling and ISI activities originating in Nepal.6
According to premier intelligence agencies, the Shiliguri corridor faces threat not only from this pattern of free movement of personnel and goods through the border areas, but also from insurgents operating from Bhutan and particularly in Assam. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) militants have been using the corridor for their movement for a long time. The recent emergence of another insurgent outfit, called the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO),7 in north Bengal, is adding to the worries of the security forces. Intelligence reports indicate that, in 1993, certain members of the Rajbongshi community belonging to the ranks of the All Kamtapur Students’ Union (AKSU) approached ULFA cadres in the Kokrajhar district of Assam and sought arms training from them. They were primarily directing their efforts towards organising an armed struggle for realising their demand of a separate Kamtapur State, carved out of the districts of north Bengal. Following their contact, 12 Rajbongshi youth were allowed to be trained in a training camp organised by the ULFA in Bhutan to the north of the trijunction of Bhutan-West Bengal-Assam. The training could not be completed due to a constant threat from the security forces and also because certain ULFA cadres had surrendered.
The Rajbongshi leadership, primarily the AKSU, however, continued their efforts. They contacted some members of the central leadership of ULFA, who in turn agreed to train them on the condition that they form a secessionist outfit. This led to the formation of the KLO. Members of the newly formed KLO were imparted arms training during 1996-97 in Samdrup Jhankar in Bhutan where the central headquarters of ULFA is situated.8 The KLO also established its headquarters near the ULFA HQ at Samdrup Jhankar. The ULFA’s agenda was to prop up the Rajbongshi militants for its own gains, and the West Bengal tribals were aiding the outfit to create safe havens in North Bengal.9 The trained KLO cadres, on their return from Bhutan mingled with the activists of the Kamtapur Peoples’ Party (KPP) and AKSU, and have been working with them. An estimated 100 KLO terrorists have received arms training at the Gelengphu and Kalaikhola camps in Bhutan, and reports also indicate that the ULFA and KLO had reached an agreement to launch a joint armed struggle.10 The movement for Kamtapur has thus turned violent with sporadic incidents of looting, extortion, killings and sabotage. Of late, the KLO and the ULFA have started an extortion drive targeting the local tea gardens.11 They are most active in Alipurduar in Jalpaiguri and Shiliguri sub-division of Darjeeling.
Reports indicate that a large number of KLO cadres have received arms training at the ULFA camps in neighbouring Bhutan.12 There are also reports of growing terrorist and subversive activities by the KLO in league with ULFA militants. Pakistan-trained and ISI-backed ULFA insurgents are reported to have imparted arms training to three successive batches of KLO insurgents. Of the three KLO batches, one was trained in a forest in Jalpaiguri district, while the other two were trained in Bhutan.13 The arrest of a KLO activist from Matabhanga on May 29, 2001 exposed the linkages between KLO and ULFA and the training structures in the corridor.14 Earlier, three KLO insurgents arrested from Cooch Behar on December 8, 2000, confessed to having undergone advanced arms training in the ULFA camp in the Fifshu jungles of Bhutan.15 According to official sources, they were part of a 60-strong batch of KLO and ULFA cadre, who had received advanced arms training between April 15 and July 15, 2000, at ULFA’s Nichula area command camp.16 In certain instances, KLO militants have been reported to sneak into Assam after committing violent activities in West Bengal. The ULFA cadres are reportedly entering the plains of Bengal from the Kumargram village on the borders of Bengal, Assam and Bangladesh, to train KLO insurgents.17 ULFA cadres have been using north Bengal as a transit point to go from Bhutan to Bangladesh and vice versa, while some militants have also crossed over to Nepal through this area.18 The ULFA militants often visit north Bengal for medical attention and there are reports that ULFA cadres also use the area to transport arms and ammunition to their camps in Bhutan.19
The forests on the border of the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan with West Bengal also provide ample space for the insurgent groups to operate. The recent encounter20 between security forces and the Gorkha Liberation Organisation (GLO), a radical breakaway faction of the Subhash Ghising-led Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), cadres in the Tinkatari jungles provides ample testimony of the preparedness of the insurgents in the area, as also their growing co-ordination with various groups, particularly with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland –Issak Muivah (NSCN-IM). The attempted assassination21 of the Gorkha leader, Subhash Ghising, while he was returning to Darjeeling after a meeting with Union Home Minister Advani is an indicator of this collusion. The attack is widely believed to be the handiwork of Chhatre Subba, a one-time Ghising protege who has turned against the GNLF supremo for his purported betrayal of the Gorkhaland cause. One of the slain assailants was also identified as an NSCN-IM member. And the fact that the other team members were reported to have fled to Nepal is indicative of a broader conspiracy. The NSCN-IM is also allegedly training certain Gorkha and Nepali youths.22 Two NSCN-IM cadres were killed in an encounter in the Shamsingh forest in Darjeeling district on November 12, 2000.23 According to intelligence sources in Shiliguri, the NSCN-IM cadres were part of an instructors’ group that had travelled to West Bengal to impart arms and explosives handling training to the GLO.
Reports also suggest that the ISI was supplying a large quantity of arms and ammunition to the various Northeast terrorist outfits from the stockpiles of the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia after their defeat and eventual obliteration.24 These were picked up from the markets of Thailand and were transported to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, eventually to be used on Indian soil. The arms were shipped from Thai ports to Cox’s Bazaar and were then carried on headloads for rest of the way.25 The recipients were the NSCN-IM, ULFA and the Bodo groups.
The NSCN-IM has gradually become the primary militant outfit in the region, providing training and resources to various other groups. Recently, however, the Myanmarese authorities initiated a crackdown on the terrorist groups operating from their soil in the area. Media reports have indicated that an NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) camp was attacked by Myanmarese and Indian security forces in the Konyak region of Myanmar, adjacent to Nagaland.26 Earlier, in October 2000, a botched operation of the Myanmar Army caused the death of five Assam Rifles personnel during an encounter with the Khaplang group cadres.27 Evidently, this mounting pressure has made the NSCN-K amenable to a cease-fire, which the Indian government offered recently.
Reports indicate that while there are no training camps of the ULFA and NSCN in Coochbehar and Alipurduar, there are indications that Bodo militants have their training camps in the adjoining areas at the tri-junction of these two districts with Bhutan, in the jungles of Kalikhola in that country. The security forces have arrested certain couriers transporting ration and also ascertained the frequent movement of Bodo militants along the banks of the Sankosh river near Kalikhola. Terrorist training camps in Bhutan also exist in the areas of Goberkundi, south of Udang river, Lungkhavgma, Merungphuc, Sukhini and Dinsing river. Even though these areas do not abut the Jalpaiguri district, arrested militants have confessed to having obtained training in these areas. An ULFA terrorist, Tarani Biasya, arrested in Alipurduar on February 9, 1998, had confessed to having been trained in Sukhini. These militants often transport small arms from Bangladesh to Bhutan through the Shiliguri Corridor on trucks that transport goods to and from Bangladesh, inducing the truck drivers and owners by threats and money.
Shiliguri town is a gateway to Guwahati in Assam, Gangtok in Sikkim and Kishengunj in Bihar. It also shares borders with three countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The town’s cosmopolitan character, grown out of it being “an island of prosperity,” makes it easier for outsiders to get assimilated into the local populace, thus providing perfect cover to the subversives. In fact, the West Bengal government had admitted on the floor of the State Legislative Assembly in 1999 that the Shiliguri corridor ran the risk of being sabotaged by ISI agents. This was admitted by the then Deputy Chief Minister and Minister in-charge for Home, while responding to the Opposition’s charges following a bomb blast at New Jalpaiguri Station of north Bengal on June 22, 1999. Some 10 persons, including two Indian Army personnel bound for Kargil, were killed and more than 80 persons injured in the incident.28
Security agencies are also concerned at the mushrooming growth of mosques and madrassas (religious seminaries) in the region. According to their estimate, in the last five years the total number of madrassas that have come up in the Shiliguri Corridor area are as follows: Coochbehar – 45, Jalpaiguri – 44, Shiliguri – 63 and Islampur sub-division, North 5, Dinajpur – 467. Of these only 23 in Coochbehar are recognized by the West Bengal government; eight in Jalpaiguri; two in Shiliguri and seven in Islampur. Yet, the others are flourishing with no dearth of funds. Intelligence sources suspect that people having linkages with Pakistan-based terrorist outfits have set up at least some of these mosques and madrassas.
Intelligence reports also state that the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) – renamed as Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM) – and active in Jammu and Kashmir, has spread its tentacles in the region, with Nepal and northern West Bengal as their preferred ground. It is reportedly spreading Muslim fundamentalism and establishing a string of bases in the Northeast, as also in northern West Bengal. The HuA is reported to have succeeded in raising a large number of supporters in the Dangipara area of Shiliguri town, as also in adjoining areas like Naxalbari, Fulbari, etc.
According to intelligence sources, another organisation called Tabligh-e-Jamaat is also reported to be active around the Shiliguri Corridor. They hold regular meetings along Champasari and Bardhaman Road near Hawra camp in Shiliguri and are also in contact with the Harkat-ul-Ansar in Nepal. There are also indications of close linkages between the two groups, with senior members of each attending the meetings of the other. Although the activity of the organisation is discreet, it reportedly includes anti-India propaganda, ‘universalisation’ of Islam and raising funds for ‘Islamic causes.’
Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar districts, which constitute the Coochbehar sector of the corridor, are bounded by the Bhutan border in the north, starting from Phuntsholing to Kalikhola tri-junction, and are also contiguous with 410 kilometres of international border with Bangladesh. To the east from Kalikhola the boundary runs south along the western bank of the Sankosh River, parallel to Kokrajhar and Dhubri districts in Assam. From the Bangladesh border, there are three points where the Bhutan border is at a distance of approximately 60 kilometres. This area not only has NH 31 and NH 31A running through it, but also has broad-gauge and metre-gauge railway lines passing through before entering Assam. The demographic character of the area along the Bhutan border comprises Santhals, Bodos, Nepalis and Rajbongshis. In the Cooch Behar sector live the Bengali Hindus, Rajbongshis, Bengali and Bihari Muslims. Rajbongshis, Bengali Hindus and Muslims live in the areas along the Bangladesh border.
The demographic profile within a 5-kilometre belt of the international border with Bangladesh has undergone rapid changes. According to intelligence sources, in Jalpaiguri district, while the population of Hindus and Muslims has been 1,35,938 and 1,63,522 respectively in 1981, in 1991 it rose to 1,90,805 and 2,35,733 respectively. In Coochbehar, the figure in 1981 was 2,17,588 and 1,41,001 respectively; while in 1991 it was 2,94,038 and 1,85,528 respectively. In the Shiliguri sub-division of Darjeeling district, the numbers were 48,110 and 71,215, respectively, in 1981; while in 1991, they were 72,518 and 1,12.302, respectively. In the Islampur and Raigunj sub-divisions of north Dinajpur, they were 1,78,583 and 2,60,507, respectively, in 1981; rising to 2,51,472 and 3,41,325, respectively, in 1991.
In early 1999, a media report had indicated that a significant demographic transformation was occurring around the Corridor, causing serious concern among security agencies. The report, quoting official sources, pointed out that, while in 1971 the Muslim population was 15 per cent, in recent years it has touched a high of 70 per cent in some areas, primarily due to illegal immigration from Bangladesh. The report referred to the phenomenon of a large number of Muslim immigrants residing in Islampur of North Dinajpur district as also Kishangunj of Bihar. The report had also claimed that untrammelled passage through these areas was available to the thousands of Bihari Muslims who claim Pakistan’s nationality but remain in Bangladesh because the former refuses to take them in.29
Given the criticality of threat perceptions, one needs to discern the reasons for such an apparent laxity in vigil. It is plausible to seek explanations in the tradition of thin policing of the borders in the area. Security force levels in the Cooch Behar sector30 consist of four units of the Border Security Force (BSF) deployed along the 410 km of the international border, from border post number 814 to 1001; on the Assam-Bhutan border, a three-company strength of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is deployed. The West Bengal Armed Police maintains a platoon and an Army unit is deployed in Cooch Behar, but is not assigned internal security duty. SSB companies are also deployed in Tufanganj, Natuarpur and Hindusthan, and in other areas in the sector. The configuration of intelligence agencies in the area has the Intelligence Bureau at the apex followed by the Field Intelligence Units (FIU) of the Army, SSB and the BSF. Efforts are currently being directed towards seeking a unified effort and greater co-ordination in operations of the security forces.
One of the key security concerns of the area is gunrunning. According to a media report, there were two routes through which this lucrative trade was being conducted. In the first, arms were first sent to certain safe havens in Shiliguri and later dispatched in small quantities by local couriers who would typically travel by road or rail. Consignments were then loaded on Dooars-bound buses heading towards Jaigaon on the Indo-Bhutan border. Gunrunners also utilise the metre-gauge railway line between Shiliguri and Alipurduar via Hashimara and Birpara. They are then transferred to hideouts in the Jayanti hills in the north or Alipurduar in the south.31 The other preferred route is through the riverine tri-junction in Kishangunj in the Coochbehar district of West Bengal. The loads are ferried by country boats at night and later transported in small numbers by local carriers to Islamabad in Madarihat and Falakata in the Jalpaiguri district.
Another cause for concern for the security apparatus is the growing nexus between the militant groups and illegal timber traders. Along the Assam-West Bengal border, timber trading is a lucrative business due its high demand in West Bengal and in other parts of the country. Various sawmills in the area north of Bakshirhat in Cooch Behar are reported to be recipients of smuggled timber, including teak and sesame wood, from Assam. Sawmill owners enjoy the patronage of terrorist outfits based in Assam, who in turn extort large sums of money from them in return for security. In their operations, the militants also utilise various modes of transport like trucks, mini vans and motorcycles owned by the sawmill owners. Recent developments show that the Bodo militants, as also the ULFA, have shifted base to the forests of Bhutan, traversing from their earlier safe houses in Bangladesh. At the narrowest point in the region, the distance between the Bhutan border and the Bangladesh border is a mere 60 kilometres. And considering the fact that the Cooch Behar sector is relatively calm, it is policed lightly. Furthermore, there are no mobile checkposts in the region to challenge any movement of suspicious nature.
Intelligence agencies fear that many key installations in the Shiliguri Corridor are liable to sabotage by militants. Such installations include the bridge on the national highway near Barovisha in Darjeeling district, the railway-bridge over river Raidhak, the bridge connecting the national highway and the railway-bridge over Sankosh River.
Before 1947, the North Eastern States, especially Assam, were connected with the mainland through waterways, road and railway networks running through what was then a part of the Bengal Presidency and later named East Pakistan and, eventually, Bangladesh. Thus, linkages between that country and the Assamese were deep, and these, the ISI later sought to exploit. In fact, a Foreign Service officer of Bangladesh, Mohammad Siddique, has claimed that “India had received the corridor at Shiliguri, though Bangladesh (i.e. the then East Pakistan) had more claims over the territory because of population characteristics.”32
Such a mindset has created worries in the security establishment, and these were articulated by the former Director of the Intelligence Bureau and former Governor of West Bengal, T V Rajeshwar: “It is not Kashmir alone which should cause anxiety. The Bangladeshi infiltration, which continues unabated, has changed the demographic pattern of eastern India. There is a grave danger to the Shiliguri Corridor, which is the lifeline of the seven North Eastern states and Sikkim, because of the concentration of the Bangladeshi migrants there. Bengal’s premier in 1946, Nizamuddin, wrote to Governor R.G. Casey that Bengal would soon become a Muslim majority province if left undisturbed. Even if his dream was belied because of the Partition, Dr. Henry Kissinger’s foreboding of a Muslim majority state emerging from within Indian borders is there to contend with.”33
Thus, it is evident that the Shiliguri Corridor faces major threats in its geographical vicinity from the overbearing Chinese presence as also from relatively minor neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Furthermore, the overarching consideration in the security framework is the ability of Pakistan to subvert the regimes in these countries and consequently increase insurgent pressures in the area.
Since the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the architect of Bangladesh and its first Premier, every regime in that country has fostered anti-Indian forces within its territorial ambit. Indeed, Begum Khaleda Zia, the current Premier, had gone to the extent of calling the Northeast insurgents, “freedom fighters.”34 The crucial leverage that Bangladesh has gained in its endeavour to create instability in India at a low cost is the large number of its own people residing on Indian soil. The Bangladeshis have a novel way of ‘legalising’ their immigration in India. The relatives who are in India reportedly get the names of those across the border included in the voters’ list during enumeration. As their names finally appear in the list, messages are then sent across to them to finally cross over. It is this population that reportedly creates a buffer of non-combatants for the militants and they utilise them as perfect cover.
Even though an Indian protectorate, the Royal Kingdom of Bhutan has, in the recent past, played host to ULFA and Bodo militants, who have found a comfortable habitat in the southern part of the country. In fact, some reports claim that captured ULFA cadres have vouched to witnessing three visits by the King of Bhutan to their camps. However, recent reports reveal that the Bhutanese government has commenced fortification of its borders with Assam, ostensibly to deter the free passage of militants. They have reportedly deployed 3,000 troops on the border and are planning to put more forces on the ground.35 But the King and the government indicate marked reluctance to engage the militants on the grounds that “We are not sure of the kind of support these militant groups enjoy in Assam and in case there is an armed conflict between the Bhutanese security forces and the militants, it would have a major impact on the country’s economy and its age-old relations between the people of Bhutan and Assam would be seriously affected. It may take many years before the relations normalised.”36
Certain analysts perceive eastern Nepal, bordering the Shiliguri Corridor, to be the springboard for Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in the Northeast. Nepal’s proximity to this passage assumes significance because of its strategic importance. Bound by Nepal and Bangladesh in the south, the use of this passage for transferring small arms and contraband from both the countries is now well established.37
The fact that Nepal has been open to subversion by ISI operatives is also beyond dispute. Yakoob Memon, one of the accused in the 1993 Mumbai blast case, was traced in Nepal,38 and then the infamous IC-814 hijacking had its origins at the Tribhuvan International Airport, causing substantial damage to bilateral relations between India and Nepal, which took some effort in mending. But the fact that the Nepalese are not adopting a laid-back attitude about taking actions against those who are using their territory for launching anti-India campaigns is evident in the recent arrest and incarceration of a senior Pakistani diplomat, who was found in possession of large quantities of explosives.39
In 1962, when the Chinese had begun their troop concentration across the border, Indian security planners were rightly worried about the possible threat to eastern India. This had led to a decision to withdraw troops from the Punjab border with Pakistan and mass them in Shiliguri focusing on the area of the Corridor. This was a difficult decision to make because intelligence agencies were suspicious of General Ayub Khan’s intentions. Yet, the then Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, had obtained the necessary clearance from the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to move troops from the Northwest to the East.40
One may take note that the Kamtapur Peoples’ Party (KPP), which contested the recent elections to the State Legislative Assembly in West Bengal, had failed to secure a significant mandate. Receiving an average of seven per cent of the total votes polled, the KPP has been humbled in vast tracts of North Bengal, which it wants to be a part of their ‘new State’ of Kamtapur. But now that they have failed to secure democratic sanction for themselves that could have validated their demand by providing numerical muscle, what will the party’s next agenda be? There exists a sense of collective denial about the existence of any insurgent action committed by anyone attached to the movement for a separate Kamtapur.41 Almost to a man, the KPP leadership has refused to acknowledge the existence of the KLO, even as the security agencies were equally insistent about its threatening presence.
In the light of these developments, it is imperative to critically scrutinise the significance of the Shiliguri Corridor and to initiate steps to render it safe in the larger interest of maintaining the sovereign security and integrity of the region as also of the nation.
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ENDNOES
# Pinaki Bhattacharya is a Special Correspondent with Mathrubhumi, and is based in Kolkata, covering West Bengal and the Northeast.
The meeting took place in Assam. Source: Intelligence reports.
“Evaluation of the Chinese Threat”, See http://www.indiavotes.com/columns1/2001feb2-tksludra.html
The corridor comprises Islampur sub-division of Darjeeling district, Jalpaiguri Sadar and Alipurduar sub-divisions of Jalpaiguri district and Toofanganj, Mathabhanga, Coochbehar Sadar, Dinhata and Mekhliganj sub-divisions of Coochbehar district.
Based on the report of the Kargil Review Committee chaired by K Subrahmanyam, the then Convenor of the National Security Advisory Board, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee constituted a Group of Cabinet Ministers (GoM) in April 2000 to review the national security system and to formulate specific proposals for implementation. The GoM set up four task forces, one each for intelligence apparatus, border management, internal security and management of defence. Madhav Godbole, a former Home Secretary, headed the task force on border management. He submitted a 499-page report to the GoM, headed by erstwhile Union Home Minister L.K. Advani.
See “Ministerial group gets report on border management”, http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/20000830/ina30040.html; The Godbole report recommended that paramilitary forces such as the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and Assam Rifles should man international borders, but operate directly under the army in cases where the boundary line is unsettled or under dispute.
The Telegraph, Kolkata, December 11, 2000
The Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) was formed in 1995 by the Koch-Rajbongshi tribes to carve out a separate Kamatapur State, comprising six north Bengal districts and Goalpara district in lower Assam through an armed struggle. For a profile of the KLO, see South Asia Terrorism Portal; India; Terrorist Groups; Assam; KLO; http://www.satp.org
“WB separatists woo Assam tribals” http://www.northeastvigil.com/newsarch/01121999i.htm
Ibid. The decision to prop up Rajbongshi rebel outfits was taken by the ULFA in December 1995 at the initiative of Raju Baruah, a senior leader of the ULFA’s military wing. Subsequently, the ULFA entrusted the then chairman of its Darrang district unit, Ajit Kachari, with the task of setting up the Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO) in Lower Assam. Simultaneously, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) was formed in North Bengal following a meeting at Kumargram. The first batch of 25 KRLO members went to the ULFA camps in Bhutan for training in December 1995.
“India: ULFA, KLO to launch joint movement in Assam”. Both the outfits also decided to indulge in joint extortion drives in Assam. This decision was taken at a meeting in Bhutan in July 2001. http://www.satp.org/news/2001/August/news23.htm
“India: North Bengal turning into hotbed of militancy”, http://www.satp.org/news/November/news%2014.htm#8
See South Asia Terrorism Portal ; India; Terrorist Groups; Assam; KLO; http://www.satp.org
“West Bengal seeks more forces” http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/09wb.htm
“Kamtapur-Ne Nexus Uncovered”, http://www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1010531/national.htm#head2
“Ominous Kamtapur Nexus Unearthed”, http://www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1001210/front_pa.htm#head2
Ibid. Nichula base is adjacent to Kalikhola on the Indo-Bhutan border north of Uttar Haldibari. The camp, reportedly, is approximately 8 km north of Allay bust, the last Bhutanese border village, inside the Fifshu jungle.
“Separatist movement in North Bengal gets Ulfa help”, http://www.news.india-today.com/ntoday/newsarchives/100/12/10/n133.shtml
“Bengal CM cautions against ultras”, http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ne.htm
Ibid.
Two suspected militants were killed in an encounter with police at Tinkatari near Samshing, close to the Bhutan border on November 12, 2000. Those killed were reportedly cadres of the Gorkha Liberation Organisation. One security force personnel was killed and another injured during the encounter. See “Naga ultras killed in shootout”, Statesman, Kolkata, November 13, 2000.
On February 9, 2001, militants armed with sophisticated rifles and grenades attacked Ghising’s convoy bound for Darjeeling from Shiliguri on a narrow and winding mountain road. See “Thunder in the hills”, Hindu, Chennai, February 18, 2001. Subba was arrested on March 23, 2001 near the Indo-Nepal border.
“Stealthily, a rebel Gorkha group builds a base”, http://news.india-today.com/ntoday/newsarchives/100/11/28/n52.shtml.
“Bengal CM cautions against ultras”, http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ne.htm
“Ultra Getting Arms from Khmer Rouge”, http://piglet.uccs.edu/~kalita/assam/news/1997/1997-11-25.html, See also “ISI training outfits in camps across Bangladesh”, http://www.northeastvigil.com/newsarch/16052000i.htm#i06
See South Asia Terrorism Portal; India; Assessment; http://www.satp.org
Times of India, New Delhi, May 19, 2001.
Indiainfo.com, October 26, 2000.
Pioneer, New Delhi, June 23, 1999. Also see “The Islamization of West Bengal”, http://www.swordoftruth.com/swordoftruth/archives/byauthor/dhruvajyotibarua/ tiowb.html
Times of India, February 15, 1999.
Intelligence sources.
Telegraph, December 13, 2000.
“Kathmandu Revisited”, People’s Review, Kathmandu, August 7, 1997.
T.V Rajeshwar, “The Lessons of Kosovo”, Hindu, May 5, 1999.
Sreeradha Dutta, Security of India’s Northeast: External Linkages”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, November 2000, Vol. XXIV No. 8, p. 1506.
Times of India, May 19, 2001.
Times of India, April 16, 2001.
Hindu, September 8, 1999.
Dutta, “Security of India’s Northeast”, p. 1506.
Police in Kathmandu arrested a senior Pakistani diplomat Mohammad Arshad with 16 kg of RDX on April 12, 2001. According to official sources, the arrested diplomat, the first secretary in the Pakistani Embassy, was due to return to his country after a posting in Nepal. See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailsmall_news.asp?date1=4/13/2001&id=7
B.N. Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal, Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971, p. 382.
This was made evident during the writer’s visit to the region.